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In this dissertation, I investigate the interplay between competition and 
cooperation in R&D alliances. The alliance literature on this issue has emphasized that 
product market rivalry (i.e., market overlap) between partnering firms aggravates 
cooperation hazards by increasing the private benefits from opportunism. However, 
drawing on the multimarket competition literature, I maintain that market overlap 
between alliance partners can rather curb opportunism by partners because the 
multimarket contact between them might increase the expected costs of opportunistic 
behaviors by enabling broad retaliation against such behaviors across the shared markets. 
Based on this argument, I theorize and corroborate that the mutual forbearance from 
opportunism that multimarket contact generates not only promotes the formation of R&D 
collaborations in Essay 1, but also substitutes for hierarchical governance structures in 
R&D alliances in Essay 2. In Essay 3, I also extend the prior literature on competitive 
aspects of R&D collaborations that has been mainly interested in knowledge protection 
concerns in alliances between direct rivals. I join the alliance literature with the 
agglomeration literature to argue and show that geographic co-location between an 
allying firm’s partner and the major rivals of the allying firm introduces potential indirect
xi 
 
 paths of knowledge leakage to rivals, making the allying firm more likely to employ 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Although competition and cooperation are fundamental concepts in the field of 
strategy and are inherently interdependent, the research streams on the two concepts have 
often tended to be developed separately, resulting in a lack of understanding on the 
interplay between them. In a similar vein, the alliance literature, one of the main research 
streams on cooperative strategy, has also paid relatively less attention to the competitive 
context of inter-firm collaborations. Though scant, however, there is a stream of research 
called “competition-oriented cooperation studies (Chen, 2008)”1, and this literature has 
contributed to our understanding on the interplay between competition and cooperation 
by investigating how competitive relationships between alliance partners affect the 
outcome of their collaborations. 
The key argument commonly made by the competition-oriented cooperation 
literature is that competition undermines cooperation (Harrigan, 1988; Oxley & Sampson, 
2004; Park & Russo, 1996), that is, competitive relationships between collaboration 
partners incentivize them to undertake opportunistic behaviors (e.g., shirking,
                                                 
1 The competition-oriented cooperation studies belong to the broad competition-cooperation research that 
also includes co-opetition studies and cooperation-oriented competition studies according to Chen's (2008) 
categorization. The competition-oriented cooperation studies are distinguished from the co-opetition studies 
in that the former focus on partner firms’ competition and cooperation within their partnerships, such as 
strategic alliances, while the latter mainly examine the simultaneous pursuit of competitive and cooperative 
strategies at the firm level. In addition, competition-oriented cooperation studies and cooperation-oriented 
studies are opposite to each other in terms of the cause-effect relationship of interest. The former are 
interested in how competition between partners affect their collaborations, while the latter use cooperation-
related variables to predict competitive concerns. 
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misappropriation, and hold-up) by increasing the return from such behaviors. As a result, 
collaborations between rivals tend to fail or need extra remedies for these contractual 
hazards. Furthermore, this stream of research has also claimed that as the partners’ 
competitive domains come to a complete overlap, perfect cooperation in their 
collaboration approximates a zero-sum game and thus, the cooperation-eroding effect of 
competition increases with the market overlap between partners (Oxley & Sampson, 
2004). Along this line of thought, prior empirical work in this research stream has also 
tended to use co-presence in the same broadly-defined domain (e.g., 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification [SIC]) to conceptualize the competitive tension between 
collaboration partners, and it has shown that alliances between partners from the same 
domain tend to be short-lived and have a narrow scope (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; 
Gulati, 1995a; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996; Park & Ungson, 1997).  
Although the prior work on the competitive aspects of collaboration has 
contributed to our understanding on the interplay between competition and cooperation, I 
observe three important research gaps in the literature. First, the literature has exclusively 
focused on the benefit of opportunistic behaviors in collaborations between rival firms, 
ignoring the possibility of the partner’s competitive reactions to the opportunistic 
behaviors and the associated cost. As firms competitively respond to the actions 
undertaken by others (Porter, 1980; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991), 
opportunistic behaviors also can invoke retaliation, and the loss caused by the retaliation 
might be larger than the initial gain from the opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore, the 
cost caused by retaliation against opportunism might increase with the degree of market 
overlap between partner firms because broad retaliation across more markets can damage 
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the partner firm more seriously. Therefore, the possibility of a competitive response to 
opportunism and the number of market contacts should be considered to estimate the net 
effect of competition between collaboration partners on their inclination toward 
opportunism.  
Second, while the existing literature has paid substantial attention to how the 
competitive relationships in end-product markets that alliance partners have affect their 
cooperation, it has not been interested in how the end-product market rivalry interacts 
with other types of inter-firm relationships between alliance partners in influencing the 
partner’s decisions concerning the partnership. Firms compete not only in end-product 
markets, but also in factor markets. In addition, firms are embedded in cooperative 
relationships that they have formed through prior cooperation experience. Therefore, 
considering these distinct interfirm relationships that alliance partners have outside an 
alliance might enhance our understanding on the interplay between competition and 
cooperation. 
Third, while the competition-oriented cooperation literature has been mainly 
interested in direct competitive relationships between partner firms, it has paid little 
attention to indirect competitive linkages surrounding collaborations. In inter-firm 
partnerships (particularly R&D alliances), valuable knowledge and technologies are 
inevitably shared between partner firms and therefore, they are concerned about 
knowledge leakage to the partners, especially when they collaborate with their rivals. 
This direct knowledge leakage to partnering rivals has been extensively discussed in the 
literature (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; 
Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). However, knowledge 
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leakage to rivals takes place not only through direct interactions, but also through indirect 
paths. Although some recent research has begun to address this issue of indirect 
knowledge leakages (Hernandez, Sanders, & Tuschke, 2015; Mesquita, Anand, & Brush, 
2008; Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, & Hallen, 2015), our understanding on this issue is still 
limited, at least partially due to the prior research’s exclusive focus on indirect paths that 
formal interfirm relationships form. 
In this dissertation, I aim to fill these three research gaps using R&D alliances in 
high-technology industries as a theoretical context, because R&D alliances are 
particularly prone to the risk of opportunism and entail a high level of knowledge loss 
risk. More specifically, in Essay 1 (Chapter 2), I combine the multimarket competition 
literature with the alliance literature on partner selection to argue that multimarket 
contact2 between alliance partners can facilitate the formation of R&D collaborations by 
generating mutual forbearance from opportunism.  
The multimarket competition literature has argued and shown that as two firms 
compete against each other in more markets, they mutually forbear from initiating attacks 
for fear of broad retaliation by the attacked firm across the multiple shared markets 
(Baum & Korn, 1996; Evans & Kessides, 1994; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Haveman & 
Nonnemaker, 2000; Phillips & Mason, 1996). Accordingly, in R&D alliances featuring 
the risk of opportunism by partners (Pisano, 1989), mutual forbearance generated by 
multimarket contact between partner firms might also be able to curb opportunism, as 
opportunistic behaviors are also a form of competitive action that partner firms can 
                                                 




undertake within their collaboration. Based on this argument, I claim that the reduced 
level of the risk of opportunism makes multimarket rivals attractive to each other as a 
partner for technology cooperation, promoting the formation of R&D alliances between 
them. I also maintain that this effect is more pronounced not only for technology 
partnerships with high technological uncertainty, but also for those with a broader 
vertical scope, as both cases entail greater contractual hazards.  
By joining the multimarket competition literature with the alliance literature, 
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) contributes to the competition-oriented cooperation literature by 
theorizing and corroborating that market overlap between alliance partners can reduce the 
risk of opportunism by increasing its cost. Unlike the conventional view that only 
considers the benefit of opportunism in an agreement with a rival, this argument offers a 
novel and more complete perspective on the effect of competition between alliance 
partners on the risk of opportunism by considering the partners’ possible retaliatory 
response to opportunism and the consequential costs. 
In Essay 2 (Chapter 3), I examine how multimarket contact between R&D 
alliance partners affects their alliance governance choices. The conventional view has 
been that as direct competition between alliance partners aggravates the risk of 
opportunism by partners, they need to employ more hierarchical governance structures as 
a remedy for the risk, as they have a higher level of market overlap between them. 
However, based on the same theory developed in Essay 1 (Chapter 2), I argue that 
multimarket contact rather reduces the need for hierarchical governance modes by 
generating mutual forbearance from opportunism. In addition, I further investigate how 
different dyadic relationships between alliance partners (i.e., competitive relationships in 
6 
 
end-product markets and factor markets and previous cooperative relationships) interplay 
with one another in affecting the partner firms’ proclivity toward opportunism and 
governance choice. Specifically, drawing on the recent multimarket competition literature 
on factor market rivalry (Markman, Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009), I claim that factor 
market rivalry intensifies mutual forbearance and thus, the substituting effect of 
multimarket contact for hierarchical governance structures is intensified when the 
alliance partners pursue similar technologies. In addition, based on the literature on 
relational embeddedness (Gulati, 1995a, 1995b), I maintain that the same substituting 
effect is weakened when alliance partners have previous cooperative ties, because prior 
collaborative experience and multimarket contact play a redundant role in reducing the 
risk of opportunism by partners. 
 Essay 2 (Chapter 3) also contributes not only to the competition-oriented 
cooperation literature, but also to the relational embeddedness perspective in the alliance 
literature by showing that three distinct dyadic relationships between alliance partners, 
i.e., end-product market rivalry, factor market rivalry, and prior collaborative 
relationships, function as important boundary conditions to each other. The results 
suggest that the two literatures complement each other and the simultaneous 
consideration of the findings provides a more complete and comprehensive understanding 
on how interfirm relationships in which alliance partners are embedded determine 
cooperation hazards. 
In Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I attempt to fill the third research gap that the literature 
has been mainly interested in knowledge protection concerns in alliances between direct 
rivals and has paid little attention to indirect competitive linkages surrounding 
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collaborations. Drawing on the agglomeration literature, I maintain that geographic co-
location between an allying firm’s partner and the major rivals of the allying firm is an 
important but understudied factor that creates indirect paths of knowledge leakage to the 
rivals. The agglomeration literature has shown that geographic co-location increases the 
likelihood of knowledge spillovers to neighboring firms (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & 
Henderson, 1993), as well as transactions with them (Narula & Santangelo, 2009). Based 
on these findings, I maintain that as there are more rivals co-located with the allying 
firm’s partner, the allying firm is more exposed to the risk of knowledge loss to the rivals 
and is thus more likely to employ defense mechanisms, such as (1) the inclusion of equity 
arrangements to benefit from enhanced monitoring, control, and incentive alignment that 
equity involvement can offer and (2) the reduction of task interdependence to reduce 
knowledge sharing. I further claim that the effects of partners’ co-location with rivals on 
governance choice and task interdependence are intensified by the nearby rivals’ 
absorptive capacity. 
 Based on the results from Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I also contribute to the emerging 
literature on indirect competitive linkages by showing that the geographic co-location 
between an allying firm’s partner and the major rivals of the allying firm increases the 
allying firm’s knowledge protection concerns. Geographic co-location as a factor creating 
indirect paths of knowledge loss to rivals adds two interesting points to the literature. 
First, while previous research has exclusively focused on indirect channels via formal 
inter-firm relationships (Hernandez et al., 2015; Pahnke et al., 2015), this approach based 
on the geographic dimension shows that the literature needs to extend the scope of 
inquiry to informal paths, as well. In addition, geographic co-location aggravates the risk 
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of knowledge loss through unintentional knowledge spillovers. Therefore, firms need to 
be concerned not only about the misappropriation of knowledge but also about the risk of 
unintentional knowledge spillovers in R&D alliances. 
 For an empirical analysis, I use the biopharmaceutical industry as an empirical 
context for all three essays for several reasons. First, the biopharmaceutical industry is a 
high-technology industry where R&D alliances are regarded as an important means of 
R&D activities and thus are frequently observed (Hagedoorn, 2002). Second, the 
biopharmaceutical industry features clear market definitions based on therapeutic classes 
that are widely accepted and commonly used by U.S. government authorities and industry 
players (e.g., cholesterol regulators, anti-ulcerants, and anti-psychotics). As defining 
markets is critical in all three essays, the clear market definition in the industry is of 
crucial benefit to this dissertation and for the same reason, prior work in the multimarket 
competition literature has been carried out in the industry (e.g., Anand, Mesquita, & 
Vassolo, 2009). Third, the biopharmaceutical industry is characterized by agglomeration 
(Folta, Cooper, & Baik, 2006). Because Essay 3 (Chapter 4) focuses on the geographic 
co-location between an allying firm’s partner and its major rivals as a theoretical factor to 
aggravate the allying firm’s concern about knowledge leakage to its rivals, I need an 
empirical setting where firms agglomerate, and the biopharmaceutical industry meets this 
condition well. 
 In summary, this dissertation investigates the effects of the direct and indirect 
competitive relationships alliance partners have outside an alliance on partner selection, 
governance choice, and task interdependence in R&D alliances. I draw on insight from 
the multimarket competition literature and the agglomeration literature to shed new light 
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on the competitive aspects of R&D collaborations. Based on the findings from the 
multimarket competition literature, I argue and show that multimarket contact can not 
only promote the formation of R&D collaborations, but also substitute for hierarchical 
governance structures for the collaborative R&D efforts by increasing the costs of 
opportunism that retaliation can cause. In addition, I join the agglomeration literature 
with the alliance literature on knowledge protection concerns to theorize that the 
geographic co-location between an allying firm’s partner and the major rivals of the 
allying firm creates indirect paths of knowledge leakages to rivals, thereby affecting the 
allying firm’s decisions on governance modes and task interdependence. The three 
studies contribute to the literature on the competitive context of collaborations with new 





CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF MARKET OVERLAP ON PARTNER SELECTION 
FOR TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION 
2.1 Introduction 
Technology cooperation refers to “interfirm cooperation for which a combined 
innovative activity or an exchange of technology is at least part of their agreement,” and 
this interfirm arrangement includes various modes ranging from licensing agreements to 
R&D joint ventures (Hagedoorn, 1993). Rapid technological changes characterizing 
today’s economy render technology cooperation between firms more important than ever 
to maintain competitive advantages. Since selecting appropriate partners is one of the 
most critical factors to determine success or failure of any interfirm partnerships (Kale & 
Singh, 2009), the literature has extensively investigated who partners whom (Gimeno, 
2004; Gulati, 1995a; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014; Rothaermel 
& Boeker, 2008). Although the literature has tended to focus on resource 
complementarity as a criterion for partner selection, it has also suggested that other 
criteria also become critical depending on the partnership context (Kale & Singh, 2009). 
In particular, when partners’ behaviors are difficult to observe and the outcomes of 
collaborations are highly uncertain (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kirsch, 1996), the risk of 
opportunism by partners becomes a key criterion for partner selection (Shah & 
Swaminathan, 2008). Since such exchange hazards often surround technology 
11 
 
cooperation (Nelson & Winter, 1977; Pisano, 1989), the risk of opportunism is an 
important criterion for partner selection for technology cooperation. 
 In the literature investigating the risk of opportunism by partners, the relationships 
between potential partners have received substantial scholarly attention. For instance, 
many studies have supported the idea that previous cooperative relationships between 
potential partners—prior ties—reduce the risk of opportunism (Dyer & Singh, 1998), 
therefore making firms select previous partners repetitively (Gulati, 1995a). By contrast, 
less attention has been paid to how competitive relationships between prospective 
partners—in particular, market overlap in end-product markets—can have an impact on 
partner selection. Extant research on market overlap and opportunism has tended to 
regard market overlap between potential partners as a factor increasing the propensity for 
opportunism by partners and ex post conflicts (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 
1996). This is because market overlap between potential partners incentivizes the partners 
to behave opportunistically by increasing the payoff from such behaviors in their 
partnerships (Khanna et al., 1998). Although this argument has been rarely applied to 
partner selection, it leads to the prediction that firms would avoid partners with market 
overlap for technology cooperation at the margin. However, the multimarket competition 
literature in industrial organization economics and strategy, to which the cooperative 
strategy literature has paid little attention, provides a novel prediction opposite to the 
conventional view: market overlap between potential partners reduces the risk of 
opportunism and therefore facilitates technology partnerships.  
More specifically, the multimarket competition literature argues that as firms 
share more markets, they mutually forbear from taking aggressive actions for fear of 
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broad retaliation across the shared markets (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 
1955). This mutual forbearance hypothesis has been corroborated by many empirical 
studies showing that multimarket overlap between firms reduces attacks such as price 
cuts (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Hannan & Prager, 2004), market entry (Baum & Korn, 
1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006), and advertising (Strickland, 1985). In this paper, I 
link this mutual forbearance generated by market overlap to the risk of opportunism by 
partners. That is, I argue that since opportunistic behaviors are a kind of aggressive action 
that partners can take in their partnerships, mutual forbearance can also curb such 
behavior just as it does other kinds of attacks. Based on this argument, I claim that 
reduced opportunism between partners with market overlap makes them more likely to 
partner with each other for technology cooperation. Furthermore, I also examine some 
contingencies that shape this relationship. Given that the preference for partners with low 
risk of opportunism becomes stronger for cooperative agreements entailing a higher level 
of contractual hazards, I investigate how technological uncertainty and vertical scope—
which are known to increase exchange hazards—condition the effect of mutual 
forbearance on partner selection.  
My theory and empirical results obtained from the global biopharmaceutical 
industry contribute not only to the literature on partner selection but also to the broader 
alliance literature by providing a novel view on market overlap and interfirm cooperation. 
For instance, by linking market overlap to lower resource complementarity, previous 
research has typically argued that since firms present in the same market niches are likely 
to possess redundant assets rather than complementary assets, they are unlikely to enter 
into a partnership (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995a; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). 
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However, tying market overlap to the risk of opportunism by partners rather than 
resource complementarity, I claim that market overlap mitigates the risk of opportunism 
by partners and therefore facilitates technology cooperation. Partners’ inclination towards 
opportunism takes up more importance as a criterion to evaluate and select partners for 
technology cooperation where the observability of partners’ behaviors and the 
predictability of outcome are inherently low (Nelson & Winter, 1977; Pisano, 1989; Shah 
& Swaminathan, 2008). My arguments and findings therefore highlight the importance of 
considering the multimarket context of partnerships and the potential for mutual 
forbearance from opportunism during their formation of technology cooperation (Ariño 
& Ring, 2010; Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004; Li et al., 2008; Luo, 
1997; Shipilov & Li, 2010) and I identify important boundary conditions for the effect of 
market overlap on partner selection.  
The way that I interpret the impact of market overlap on opportunism by partners is 
also novel. Previous research has suggested that as two partners share more markets, the 
benefit of opportunistic action within the collaborative agreement increases and therefore 
the partners are exposed to a greater risk of opportunism (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). 
Although this argument provides a useful insight into the incentives partners have in the 
collaborative agreement, I suggest that it is also necessary to account for the partners’ 
possible responses against opportunism and the related costs causes by these responses. 
Since market overlap strengthens partners’ retaliatory capacity, it can also increase the 
cost caused by the retaliation against opportunism. Therefore, by integrating the 
multimarket competition literature that addresses rivals’ actions and responses, I enrich 
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the current understanding on the effect of market overlap on opportunism by partners 
and, in turn, partner selection for technology cooperation. 
 
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Multimarket Contact and Mutual Forbearance 
Multimarket contact refers to two firms competing in more than one distinct 
market (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985). According to the multimarket competition 
literature (Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2013 for a 
review of the literature), rivals having multimarket contact between them tend to 
mutually forbear from attacks, therefore lowering the intensity of rivalry (Bernheim & 
Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955). This lowered level of rivalry between multimarket 
rivals has been corroborated by many previous empirical papers, where the attenuation of 
rivalry has been measured by greater stability of market shares (Heggestad & Rhoades, 
1978; Sandler, 1988), higher profitability (Hannan & Prager, 2009; Parker & Röller, 
1997), higher prices (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Hannan & Prager, 2004), lower entry and 
exit rates (Baum & Korn, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006), less frequent competitive 
behavior (Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2007), smaller 
investments in tangible and intangible resources (Kang, Bayus, & Balasubramanian, 
2010; Shankar, 1999), and lower service quality (Prince & Simon, 2009). 
Mutual forbearance takes place because multimarket rivals realize that an 
aggressive action taken in one market may provoke broad retaliation by rivals, not only in 
the market where the attack was initiated but also in other shared markets. This broad 
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retaliation may eventually result in a larger loss than the initial gain in one market from 
an attack (Evans & Kessides, 1994; Feinberg, 1985; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; 
Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Phillips & Mason, 1996). That is, the attacked firm’s ability 
to retaliate to cause the attacker serious financial damage will then be taken into account 
in analyzing the benefit and cost of current attacks. The shadow of the future created by 
the prospect of broad retaliation functions to deter current attacks.   
The potential for mutual forbearance between two firms increases with the degree 
of multimarket contact between them because multimarket contact provides a better 
ability and more opportunities to retaliate against current attacks (Jayachandran et al., 
1999). As two firms share more markets, retaliation across the shared markets can hurt 
the attacker more seriously (Edwards, 1955). Also, the larger number of markets of 
overlap means more areas to retaliate against current attacks (Jayachandran et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, previous work has also shown that mutual forbearance potential depends 
not only on the mere number of shared markets but also on some attributes of the shared 
markets. Mutual forbearance potential increases with the strategic importance of the 
shared markets because possible retaliation in an unimportant market may not provide 
deterrence from attacks (Feinberg, 1985; Mester, 1987; Scott, 1982). Furthermore, the 
asymmetry of strategic importance also affects the degree of deterrence. That is, as two 
firms are more dissimilar in terms of their presence in the shared markets, the deterrence 
between them becomes more effective (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Gimeno, 1999). 
This is because if one firm has footholds of small market share in the other firm’s 
important markets and vice versa, they can substantially hurt each other at a small cost, 
and thus threats of retaliation become more credible (Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; 
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Gimeno, 1999). In addition, the number of competitors in the shared markets is also an 
important factor influencing mutual forbearance potential because the detection of 
deviation from mutual forbearance becomes harder, and retaliation becomes less 
effective, as there are more other firms in the market (Evans & Kessides, 1994; Feinberg, 
1985). 
 
2.2.2 Mutual Forbearance from Opportunism in Technology Cooperation 
 In the context of technology cooperation, mutual forbearance between partners 
with market overlap can reduce opportunism by partners given the shadow of the future 
(e.g., Parkhe, 1993) that is created by possible broad retaliation. In a technology 
cooperation agreement between two partners with no market overlap, one partner who is 
victimized by the other’s opportunistic behavior has several options to respond to the 
opportunistic behavior. For instance, barring a successful private resolution of a dispute, 
the partners can appeal to third parties (e.g., courts) if their contracts include provisions 
that are directly related to the detected opportunistic behavior (Reuer & Ariño, 2007). 
However, the effectiveness of this option may be restricted owing to the inherent 
incompleteness of contracts and the costs and lead time involved. Other options include 
passive responses such as behaving opportunistically in an eye-for-an-eye fashion within 
the partnership, terminating the relationship, and ruling out an opportunistic partner for 
future cooperation. These options can also be ineffective because the first two hinder the 
achievement of cooperation objectives and the last one would also be of limited 
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effectiveness in creating a shadow of the future if the opportunistic partner views the 
focal agreement in one-off terms. 
If two partners have market overlap, however, one partner can effectively respond 
to the other’s opportunistic behavior by retaliating in the overlapped end-product 
markets. Furthermore, if market overlap between them is substantial and retaliation takes 
place across the shared markets, it can cause the opportunistic partner substantial damage 
(Jayachandran et al., 1999). One thing to note is that the market overlap between them 
provides both partners with retaliatory capacity and, therefore, none of them cannot easily 
initiate opportunistic behaviors. That is, the partners mutually forbear from 
opportunistically behaving within the partnership because it may escalate the intensity of 
their competition in the shared markets. The benefit from opportunistic behaviors in the 
partnership may be not only uncertain but also marginal relative to the possible costs 
caused by the intensified competition. In particular, if the two partners with market 
overlap are currently enjoying substantial rents in the overlapping markets, they may 
suffer a big loss in going after a small gain by behaving opportunistically in the 
cooperation. In sum, as two firms have a higher level of mutual forbearance potential 
generated by their market overlap, they experience a lower risk of opportunism.  
The literature on partner selection has argued that partners’ inclination toward 
opportunism becomes a key criterion for partner selection when partners’ behaviors are 
difficult to observe and the outcomes of collaborations are highly unpredictable (Shah & 
Swaminathan, 2008). Since technology cooperation typically entails such exchange 
hazards (Nelson & Winter, 1977; Pisano, 1989), firms strongly prefer partners with low 
risk of opportunism for technology cooperation. Accordingly, as two potential partners 
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have higher potential for mutual forbearance from opportunism, they are more likely to 
partner with each other for technology cooperation. I therefore posit:  
Hypothesis 1:  The likelihood of technology cooperation between two firms is 
positively related to the degree of mutual forbearance potential 
between them. 
 
2.2.3 Contingent Effects of Mutual Forbearance Potential on Partner Selection 
So far, I have argued that market overlap between two potential partners generates 
mutual forbearance from opportunism, thereby making them attractive to each other as 
partners for technology cooperation. However, the attractiveness of partners with market 
overlap can vary depending on the hazards of opportunism the partners anticipate. That 
is, when a potential technology partnership is expected to entail a higher level of 
contractual hazards, firms will put more weight on prospective partners’ inclination 
towards opportunism as a criterion for partner selection (Shah & Swaminathan 2008). 
Under these conditions, partners with a higher potential for mutual forbearance from 
opportunism will be even more preferred. By contrast, when opportunism is expected to 
be lower, the mutual forbearance potential of market overlap would have a lesser impact 
on partner selection for technology cooperation. Therefore, factors known to influence 
the hazards of cooperation will also shape the effects of mutual forbearance potential on 
partner selection.  
The TCE literature emphasizes transaction attributes as determinants of 
contractual hazards (Williamson, 1985). In particular, uncertainty has long been regarded 
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as one of the major factors determining contractual hazards in the literature (Williamson, 
1985). As the degree of uncertainty surrounding a transaction increases, it is more 
difficult for the participating parties to write a complete and enforceable contract. Since 
technological uncertainty is a key dimension of uncertainty in technology cooperation by 
definition, I examine whether the mutual forbearance potential created by market overlap 
will take on greater importance for technology partnerships with higher technological 
uncertainty. In addition, research on technology cooperation has often emphasized the 
vertical scope of agreements given the conceptual clarity of this transactional attribute as 
well as data availability (Li et al., 2008; Oxley, 1997; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Phene & 
Tallman, 2012; Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). This research suggests that cooperative 
agreements with a broader vertical scope entail a higher level of contractual hazards 
compared to those with a narrower vertical scope. Therefore, I also investigate whether 
the effect of mutual forbearance potential on partner selection will be intensified by the 
vertical scope of technology cooperation. 
Technological Uncertainty. The TCE literature has long suggested uncertainty as 
one of the key transactional attributes determining the level of expected contractual 
hazards (Williamson, 1985). As uncertainty increases, the occasions for sequential 
adaptations increase in number and importance and accordingly contractual gaps also 
enlarge, aggravating exchange hazards (Williamson, 1979). Technology cooperation 
inevitably entails technological uncertainty due to the inherently uncertain nature of 
innovative activities (Nelson & Winter, 1977). Technological uncertainty refers to “the 
probability of improvements in technology; i.e. to new generations of technology which 
might render obsolete the  current technology development effort” and has tended to be 
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regarded as an exogenous variable given by the area of interest (Robertson & Gatignon, 
1998).  
When technological uncertainty is high, it is difficult to understand involved 
cause-effect relationships (Duncan, 1972) and to predict accurately the outcome of a 
decision (Downey & Slocum, 1975). Therefore, when firms collaborate for the 
development of a highly uncertain technology, they are likely to go through a series of 
trials and errors and encounter various unexpected contingencies, which all make it 
difficult to write a complete and enforceable contract ex ante. When contract-based 
formal governance is not an effective means to reduce contractual hazards, firms can 
mitigate the risks by selecting partners estimated to be low in inclination toward 
opportunism. Accordingly, firms who have a high level of market overlap and thus are 
likely to mutually forbear from opportunistic behaviors become more attractive to each 
other as partners as the collaboration between them entail a higher level of technological 
uncertainty. By contrast, when technological uncertainty in a technology cooperation 
agreement is low, the joint effort can be effectively managed by formal contractual 
apparatus and thus proclivity for opportunism might become less important as a criterion 
for partner selection. Therefore, although the reduced risk of opportunism that mutual 
forbearance between multimarket rivals causes is generally appreciated in searching for 
partners for R&D activities, firms with a high level of market overlap are more preferred 
as a partner for technology cooperation entailing a high level of technological uncertainty 
compared to the case of low technological uncertainty. I therefore posit:  
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Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of mutual forbearance potential on partner 
selection is greater for technology cooperation entailing higher 
technological uncertainty. 
 
Vertical Scope of Technology Cooperation. Technology cooperation often 
includes other downstream activities such as manufacturing and marketing. Research in 
the field of technology and operations management has highlighted that firms can reduce 
time-to-market and improve quality of new product introductions by having overlapping 
activities and using cross-function teams (Loch & Terwiesch, 2000). Although this 
argument concerns within-firm arrangements, the same logic can apply to interfirm 
cooperation, leading to the conclusion that including manufacturing and/or marketing 
functions in interfirm technology cooperation can provide the partners the same benefits 
of reduced time-to-market and improved quality of new product introductions (Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004). 
However, such merits of collaborations entailing broad vertical scope do not come 
without important drawbacks. Previous research has also emphasized that broad scope 
collaborations can exacerbate the potential risk of opportunism and thus influence initial 
governance choice and ex post governance changes. Pisano (1989) argued that when 
transactions involve a broader range of products or technologies, equity-based 
governance modes are more likely to be chosen. This is because involving multiple 
projects aggravates contractual hazards by increasing the number of contingencies that 
must be written into the initial contract and contributes to the possibility of unanticipated 
contingencies arising during the course of relationship. Oxley (1997) also maintained that 
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as a technology transfer alliance includes a broader range of products or technologies, the 
difficulty and costs of monitoring activities inevitably increase, making involved firms 
choose a more hierarchical governance structure. Consistent with the argument that it is 
difficult to specify partners’ rights and obligations in broad-scope alliances, which entail 
gaps that become evident during alliance implementation, Reuer and colleagues (2002) 
report that alliances with broad scope are more likely to be renegotiated. Firms can also 
contend with these same challenges during partner selection, prioritizing those partners 
that come with less risk in the first place. Therefore, when firms search for partners for 
technology cooperation of broader scope, they will prefer partners characterized by low 
risk of opportunism to a larger extent. Thus, partners with a high level of mutual 
forbearance potential will become more attractive as partners for technology cooperation 
of broader scope. All else equal, for narrow-scope partnerships for which opportunism is 
of lesser concern, the benefits of mutual forbearance potential will be lower. I therefore 
posit:  
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of mutual forbearance potential on partner 
selection is greater for technology cooperation including 






2.3.1 Sample and Data 
To test how mutual forbearance potential affects partner selection for technology 
cooperation, I use the global biopharmaceutical industry as the empirical context of my 
study. This industry is ideal for this purpose for two reasons. First, market definitions in 
this industry are very clear. In this study, it is critical to define end-product markets to 
make sure that firms defined as present in the same end-product market actually compete 
with each other. The global biopharmaceutical industry is clearly classified into 
therapeutic classes widely accepted by U.S. government authorities and industry 
participants (e.g., cholesterol regulators, antiulcerants, and antipsychotics) (Anand et al., 
2009). Also, because drugs in the same therapeutic class are substitutes for each other in 
most cases, the biopharmaceutical companies offering their products in the same 
therapeutic class are direct competitors in the class. Second, this industry exhibits high 
rates of technology cooperation (Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002), and given the amount of 
research carried out in this industry, my focus on this empirical context is valuable for 
purposes of drawing comparisons across studies on the determinants of alliance 
formation.  
In order to examine firms’ activities in different markets, I rely on data provided 
by IMS Health, a leading information provider in the biopharmaceutical industry that 
collects prescription drug revenue data by therapeutic class for companies around the 
world. I draw on the IMS Health data focusing on the top 200 prescription drug sales 
companies in 2007, which occupied more than 90% of total global prescription drug sales 
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in the year. For data on technology cooperation, I use the Thomson Reuters’ Recap 
database. The Recap database compiles alliance information primarily from the filings of 
biopharmaceutical companies with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A 
recent analysis found the Recap database to be robust and representative in its coverage 
of alliances in the global biopharmaceutical industry (Schilling, 2009), and it has been 
used widely in the literature (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 2003; 
Robinson & Stuart, 2007). In addition, I obtain patent data from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). 
 
2.3.2 Variables and Measurement 
Dependent variable. I have three different dependent variables in this study. The 
first dependent variable used to test H1 is Technology Cooperationijt taking the value of 
one if firms i and j in a dyad form a technology cooperation agreement in year t, and zero 
otherwise. The unit of analysis of this study is the dyad between two biopharmaceutical 
firms. Prior studies have often analyzed cooperation between firms at the dyad level 
(Gimeno, 2004; Gulati, 1995a; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Since the 
biopharmaceutical industry is not characterized by alliance blocks, the usage of dyads as 
the unit of analysis is further justified (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Regarded as equal 
in a priori risk of forming a technology cooperation agreement, all the possible 19,900 
dyads (=200C2) between the 200 firms are constructed and included in the alliance 
opportunity risk set. They are also tracked from 2007 to 2013 to construct a panel. Since 
the dependent variable is measured annually, it is also possible for two firms to form 
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multiple agreements in the same year. There were nine such cases in my sample and I 
included all of them as separate dyad-year observations, giving me in the final sample of 
139,309 dyad-year observations.  
To test H2, I developed Technological Uncertaintyijt, which takes three different 
values: zero when firm i and firm j in a dyad do not form a technology cooperation 
agreement in year t, one when the two firms enter into a technology cooperation 
agreement including a low level of technological uncertainty, and two when the two firms 
enter into a technology cooperation with a high level of technological uncertainty. To 
distinguish low and high technological uncertainty, I used the estimates of the clinical 
approval success rate by therapeutic categories that DiMasi, Feldman, Seckler, and 
Wilson (2010) provide. I defined a technology agreement of which focal therapeutic class 
has an above-the-mean clinical approval success rate as low technological uncertainty. 
By contrast, when the focal therapeutic class of a technology cooperation has a below-
the-mean clinical approval success rate, the collaboration is defined as one with a high 
level of technological uncertainty. This categorization is consistent with the definition of 
technological uncertainty that I draw on in theory development: “the probability of 
improvements in technology; i.e. to new generations of technology which might render 
obsolete the  current technology development effort (Robertson & Gatignon, 1998).” 
Among the 147 technology cooperation agreements in the sample, 84 (57.1%) were 
defined as low technological uncertainty while 63 (42.9%) high technological 
uncertainty.   
The third dependent variable used to test H3 is Vertical Scopeijt, a categorical 
variable taking three different values. This variable takes one when firm i and firm j in a 
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dyad do not enter into a technology cooperation agreement in year t, two when the two 
firms form a technology-only cooperation (i.e., a cooperation that includes technology-
related activities only), three when the two firms form a technology-plus cooperation 
(i.e., a cooperation that involves manufacturing or/and marketing activities in addition to 
technology-related activities). Out of the total 147 technology cooperation agreements in 
the sample, 79 (53.7%) were defined as technology-only while 68 (46.3%) technology-
plus.  
 Explanatory variables. To measure mutual forbearance potential between two 
firms, I use the measure developed by Singal (1996). This measure has been regarded as 
the most comprehensive measure of mutual forbearance potential because it takes into 
account the major factors that have been demonstrated in the literature to affect mutual 
forbearance potential (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). Earlier, I argued that mutual forbearance 
potential depends not only on the mere number of shared markets but also on some 
features of the shared markets: strategic importance, asymmetry of strategic importance, 
and the number of competitors. Singal’s (1996) measure for mutual forbearance potential 
takes into account all these factors. That is, the measure basically counts the number of 
market contacts, but weights each contact by (1) the size of the market, (2) the combined 
market share of firm i and firm j in the market, (3) asymmetry of market presence of firm 
i and firm j in the market, and (4) the number of firms in the market. Specifically, in the 
measure provided below, strategic importance is reflected by the size of the market and 
the combined market share. The measure accounts for asymmetry of strategic importance 
by including the ratio of the market share of the larger firm to that of the smaller firm at 
dyad-in-market level. Therefore, this measure increases as the strategic importance of the 
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shared markets are dissimilar to each firm in a dyad. Lastly, it also takes into account the 
number of firms by putting the number of possible contacts in a market (=nC2 where n 








, for  
Where, Ii(j)m: takes 1 if firm i(j) is present at a focal market m.  
MSi(j)m: market share of firm i(j) in market m. 
Nm: number of firms in market m. 
Rm: total revenue in market m. 
Rtotal: total revenue across all markets. 
Since the unit of analysis in this study is a dyad, I aggregate MFPijm across the shared 
markets to get MFPij (=∑ 	 and use its value in a given year, MFPijt for each 
dyad-year observation3.  
 Control variables. Following previous studies that modeled the formation of 
collaboration agreements at the dyad level, I include various controls to avoid spurious 
correlations. Firms that are larger or superior in resources tend to be more attractive 
partners. As proxies for resource endowments that a firm can bring to an alliance, I use 
the firm’s size (Gimeno, 2004), number of patents (DeCarolis, 2003; Matraves, 1999; 
Roberts, 1999), and number of therapeutic classes in which it operates. At the same time, 
                                                 
3 In the multimarket competition literature, many different measures have been used to measure 
multimarket contact and mutual forbearance, but there is no consensus on which measure is the best 
(Gimeno & Jeong, 2001). Since the measure developed by Singal (1996) is the most comprehensive and 
complicated one, I also checked the results using the simplest, widely used measure that represents the ratio 
of the number of market contact between two firms to the sum of the each firm’s number of markets (Baum 
& Korn, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006). When using this simplest measure, I obtained the qualitatively 
same results as those from Singal’s (1996) measure for H1 and H2, but H3 was not supported.  
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firms may want to partner with similar firms with respect to resource endowments. 
Therefore, a pair of firms that are similar in the resource-related variables may be more 
likely to enter into a cooperation agreement. To control for these effects, I include the 
size of the larger firm of a dyad measured by annual prescription drug sales and the ratio 
of sizes in the dyad (i.e., the ratio of the smaller firm’s sales to the larger firm’s sales) 
(Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 1993; Gimeno, 2004). For intellectual resources, I also include the 
number of patents by the firm with the most patents in the dyad as well as the ratio of 
patent counts (i.e., the number of patents by the firm with less patents divided by the 
prospective partner’s patents). In the same manner, the number of therapeutic classes of 
the firm with more classes and the ratio of therapeutic classes are also included in the 
model. Controlling for the number of therapeutic classes is important for another reason: 
firms operating in many therapeutic classes may be more likely to be selected as 
cooperation partners because of increased opportunities to partner given their diverse 
operations.  
Although the patent count measures above are included in the model to control for 
the effects of the absolute and relative magnitudes of the firms’ intellectual property, the 
relatedness of their knowledge base is a different, critical dimension to be considered 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2001). If firms understand that they can be more innovative when they 
find partners having knowledge overlap due to absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990), they may prefer prospective partners who have similar knowledge bases. For 
example, Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) examined the effect of dyadic technological 
similarity on the likelihood of alliance formation in the biopharmaceutical industry, 
measuring technological similarity by the cross-citation rate and common citation rate 
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developed by Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996, 1998). Following their lead, I also 
include in the model cross citation rate and common citation rate measured as follows: 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
  
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
  
where citations are accumulated from year t-6 to year t-1.    
Some may expect that the effect of market overlap on partner selection might be 
attributed to collusive purposes rather than reduced opportunism. More specifically, firms 
may use R&D alliances as a communication channel to facilitate tacit collusion 
(Vonortas, 2000). To control for this effect, I include the increment of market power 
potential that two partners can achieve in the shared markets if they behave as one firm. 
That is, I first calculate the normalized Herfindahl indexes in the shared markets and 
average them with weights by market size. Then, assuming that the two firms behave as 
one firm, I calculate a new weighted average of normalized Herfindahl indexes in the 
shared markets. Finally, I include the difference between the two weighted averages to 
obtain the increment of market power potential.  
Cross-border technology cooperation may face some unique challenges stemming 
from information asymmetry, difficulties in monitoring and enforcement, and different 
institutional frameworks and cultures. Consistent with these observations, Hagedoorn 
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(2002) found that international R&D alliances are less common than domestic 
agreements, and the share of domestic R&D alliances has been increasing. To control for 
this effect, I include a dummy variable, International Cooperation, which takes a value of 
one if two firms in a dyad are headquartered in different countries, and zero otherwise.  
Private firms and public firms may be different in terms of business processes and 
procedures, as well as visibility to prospective partners, and these differences may affect 
the likelihood of technology cooperation (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). I therefore 
accounted for these possibilities by using two dummy variables, Private (max) and 
Private (min). The former (latter) takes one if the bigger (smaller) firm in a dyad is a 
private firm and zero otherwise. Lastly, year dummy variables are included in the model 
to control for macroeconomic or other factors influencing the propensity for the 
formation of technology cooperation in different years.  
 
2.3.3 Statistical Methods     
Given that the dependent variable for H1, Technology Cooperationijt, is a binary 
variable, I use a probit model as my base model. In addition, to avoid any potential 
effects of non-independent observations I also use robust estimation of standard errors 
using the Huber-White sandwich estimator (White, 1980). H2 compares the effects of 
mutual forbearance potential on partner selection for technology-only cooperation versus 
technology-plus cooperation while H3 for technology cooperation with a low level of 
technological uncertainty versus that with a high level of technological uncertainty. 
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Therefore, for testing H2 and H3 I use multinomial logit models with robust standard 
errors, taking non-realized deal as the omitted category4.   
For robustness analyses, I use three methods in addition to the standard models: a 
random-effects model, a penalized maximum likelihood estimation method (i.e., Firth’s 
logit model), and analysis using a different definition of technology cooperation. First, 
although I seek to capture as much variation in the dependent variables as possible with 
controls that are featured in prior studies, there is still a risk of unobserved heterogeneity 
among the dyads in the model. Therefore, I use random-effects models (i.e., random-
effects probit models for H1and random-effect multinomial models for H2 and H3) to 
mitigate this concern following prior studies on dyad-level alliance formation (Gimeno, 
2004; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014).  
 Second, the usual maximum likelihood estimation, which is used in a standard 
probit model, can be biased when the count of rare events is small (Cosslett, 1981; 
Imbens, 1992; Lancaster & Imbens, 1996). Since there are 146 realized technology 
cooperation agreements in my sample, I use Firth’s logit model using the penalized 
likelihood method for H1 where the model is applicable (Firth, 1993). This penalized 
likelihood method is a widely accepted, general approach to reducing small-sample bias. 
 Lastly, I test my hypotheses again treating licensing agreements as non-realized 
technology cooperation. In my main results, licensing agreements are also treated as 
                                                 
4 When I conducted Hausman chi-squared tests of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), I found no 
support for rejecting the null hypotheses that odds are independent of other alternatives for both 
technological uncertainty and vertical scope (for technological uncertainty, chi-sqaure (20)=10.4 and 
p=0.960 for non-realized deal, 11.3 and 0.939 for low technological uncertainty, and 9.9 and 0.969 for high 
technological uncertainty; for vertical scope, chi-sqaure (20)=21.4 and p=0.372 for non-realized deal, 13.0 
and 0.876 for technology-only cooperation, and 10.1 and 0.966 for technology-plus cooperation). 
Therefore, my usage of multinomial logit models for testing H2 and H3 was corroborated. 
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technology cooperation because licensing agreements involve transfer of technology and 
also confront greater transactional hazards relative to other unilateral agreements such as 
supply and distribution agreements. Somaya, Kim, and Vonortas (2011) highlighted that 
licensing has some critical alliance-like features. Rather than selling their intellectual 
property indiscriminately, licensors often use licensing agreements to access the 
complementary assets that licensees possess. Furthermore, this tendency is particularly 
salient in the biopharmaceutical industry which is my empirical setting (Somaya et al., 
2011). When licensors are dependent on licensees’ complementary assets, the former are 
exposed to significant risks because the latter “may devote inadequate complementary 
resources, or learn from the licensor and then commercialize its own technology, or their 
priorities may change over time, or it may simple be less capable than initially thought” 
(Somaya et al., 2011: 161). At the same time, licensees also may confront transactional 
hazards due to the uncertainty that early stage technology entails or if they are required to 
make the license-specific investments. Despite these unique features of licensing 
agreements, however, some may argue that unilateral agreements such as licensing 
agreements are inherently different from bilateral technology collaborations in terms of 
the potential risk involved. For example, Pisano (1989) argued that parties can delineate 
property rights at the outset with far less ambiguity in licensing agreements compared to 
other bilateral transactions. To mitigate this concern, I re-ran the models by excluding 
licensing agreements and focusing on other forms of technology cooperation, in order to 






Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables 
used in the analyses. The correlation between Mutual Forbearance Potential and 
Technology Cooperation is positive and significant offering preliminary support for my 
theory. Though there are many significant pairwise correlations, my models do not 
present multicollinearity concerns. Individual variance inflation factors (VIF) for the 
independent variables are all below the recommended cutoff levels of 10 (the maximum 
value was 5.35 for International Deal) and the mean value is 1.66 (Neter, Kutner, 
Nachtsheim, & Wasseman, 1996). 
Table 2.2 reports the main results of this study based on probit and multinomial 
logit models examining how mutual forbearance potential between two prospective 
partners affect the likelihood that they will partner each other for technology cooperation 
(H1) and when this relationship is more or less pronounced (H2 and H3). Model 1 in 
Table 2.2 contains the control variables only. Some estimation results for several control 
variables deserve mention. While the coefficient of Size (Max) is positive and significant, 
that of Ratio of Size (small firm to large firm) is positive and insignificant, meaning that 
although larger firms are significantly preferred as partners for technology cooperation, 
the preference for partners of similar size is not significant. These results are partially 
consistent with previous work that reported positive and significant coefficients for both 
(Gimeno, 2004). Positive and significant coefficients are estimated for both Common 
Citation Rate and Cross-citation Rate (e.g., Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). The coefficient 




Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Technology Cooperation 1                
(2) Technological Uncertainty 0.945 1               
(3) Vertical Scope 0.946 0.911 1              
(4) Mutual Forbearance Potential 0.073 0.094 0.091 1             
(5) Size (Max) 0.045 0.043 0.043 0.06 1            
(6) Ratio of Size -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.016 -0.478 1           
(7) Patent Count (Max) 0.028 0.026 0.028 0.057 0.531 -0.269 1          
(8) Ratio of Patent Count -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.2 0.2 -0.234 1         
(9) Class Count (Max) 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.033 0.471 -0.263 0.23 -0.053 1        
(10) Ratio of Class Count 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.013 -0.036 0.068 -0.015 0.032 -0.165 1       
(11) Common Citation Rate 0.026 0.029 0.024 0.013 0.087 -0.03 0.106 -0.016 0.047 0 1      
(12) Cross-citation Rate 0.019 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.035 -0.01 0.046 -0.003 0.022 -0.003 0.194 1     
(13) Increment of H-index 0.066 0.065 0.055 0.056 0.306 0.003 0.191 -0.007 0.168 0.043 0.077 0.032 1    
(14) International Deal -0.018 -0.016 -0.014 -0.001 -0.011 0.004 -0.024 0.02 0.092 -0.001 -0.014 -0.002 -0.042 1   
(15) Private (Bigger Firm) -0.014 -0.012 -0.014 -0.018 -0.267 0.249 -0.218 0.209 -0.11 0.045 -0.037 -0.014 -0.072 0.055 1  
(16) Private (Smaller Firm) -0.022 -0.02 -0.02 -0.006 -0.061 -0.043 -0.07 0.04 -0.041 0.035 -0.035 -0.005 -0.07 0.046 0.023 1 
Mean 0.001 1.002 1.002 0 6.04 0.375 53.55 0.3 116.86 0.434 0.001 0 0 0.911 0.31 0.47 
S.D. 0.032 0.049 0.05 0 10.677 0.293 123.11 0.416 59.98 0.28 0.009 0.002 0 0.285 0.462 0.499 
Min 0 1 1 0 0.038 0 0 0 1 0.004 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 1 3 3 0.001 61.767 1 1128 1 279 1 1 0.408 0.012 1 1 1 






can achieve a greater increment of market power by coordinating as one firm are more 
likely to partner each other, which is consistent with Vonortas (2000). A negative and 
significant coefficient is estimated for International Deal, which is consistent with 
Hagedoorn's (2002) observation of the dominance of R&D partnering in the same 
regions, especially in biopharmaceuticals. The coefficients of Private (Max) and Private 
(Min) both are negative and significant, which means that firms prefer partnering public 
firms. 
Model 2 in Table 2.2 includes Mutual Forbearance Potential in addition to the 
control variables to test H1. Since the coefficient of Mutual Forbearance Potential is 
positive and significant (b=0.014 and p<0.05), H1 is supported: as two potential partners 
have a greater level of mutual forbearance potential, they are more likely to select each 
other as partners for technology cooperation. I calculated the marginal effects of each 
observation and averaged the responses (Hoetker, 2007). As the value of Mutual 
Forbearance Potential moves from the mean to one and two standard deviation from the 
mean, the likelihood of technology cooperation increases by 4.2 and 8.6 percent 
respectively5.  
H2 predicts that the positive effect of mutual forbearance potential on partner 
selection is larger for technology cooperation agreements entailing high technological 
uncertainty relative to those with low technological uncertainty. In Model 3 and 4, 
multinomial logit models are employed to compare how different the effects of mutual 
                                                 
5 When I used Baum and Korn's (1996) measure that represents the ratio of the number of market contact 
between two firms to the sum of the each firm’s number of markets, the estimated economic significance 
was substantially larger than that based on Singal’s (1996) measure. When the value of Baum and Korn’s 
(1996) measure moves from the mean to one and two standard deviation from the mean, the probability of 
technology cooperation increases by 72 and 189 percent.  
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forbearance potential on the formation of technology cooperation are depending on the 
level of technological uncertainty. The coefficients for Mutual Forbearance Potential in 
Model 3 and 4 are both positive and significant (b=0.017 and p<0.05; b=0.031 and 
p<0.01). However, the Wald test shows that the coefficient in Model 4 is significantly 
larger than that in Model 3 (Chi-square (1)=5.16 and p=0.023), supporting H2.  
H3 states that the tendency for firms to prefer prospective alliance partners with a 
high level of mutual forbearance potential is more likely when they search for partners 
for technology partnerships that involve collaboration in other functional activities at the 
same time (i.e., technology cooperation including manufacturing or/and marketing 
activities) rather than technology-only cooperation. Model 5 and 6 use multinomial logit 
models having no deal as the omitted category. While Model 5 estimates the formation of 
technology-only cooperation, Model 6 is for technology-plus cooperation. The 
coefficients of Mutual Forbearance Potential are all positive and significant in Model 5 
and 6 (b=0.018 and p<0.05; b=0.031 and p<0.001). Moreover, the coefficient in Model 6 
is larger than that in Model 5 and the two values are significantly different at 5 percent 
level as the Wald test reveals (Chi-square (1)=4.15 and p=0.042). Therefore, the 
preference for partners with a high level of mutual forbearance potential is stronger when 








Table 2.2. Main Results (Probit and Multinomial Logit Models) 
  Model 
  (1) (2) 






Hypothesis tested H1 H1 
Mutual Forbearance Potential  0.014*** 
   (0.002) 
Size (Max) 0.132*** 0.131*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) 
Ratio of Size 0.033 0.031 
  (0.035) (0.035) 
Patent Count (Max) 0.040* 0.035 
  (0.022) (0.023) 
Ratio of Patent Count 0.037 0.033 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
Class Count (Max) 0.065** 0.066** 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
Ratio of Class Count 0.070** 0.066** 
  (0.027) (0.027) 
Common Citation Rate 0.018*** 0.018*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Cross-citation Rate  0.013*** 0.013*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Increment of H-index 0.023*** 0.023*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
International Deal -0.340*** -0.343*** 
  (0.068) (0.068) 
Private (Bigger Firm) -0.168** -0.166** 
  (0.083) (0.083) 
Private (Smaller Firm) -0.448*** -0.446*** 
  (0.072) (0.072) 
Constant -2.856*** -2.869*** 
  (0.101) (0.103) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Wald Chi-square (df)  380.09*** (18) 428.55*** (19) 
Pseudo R-square 0.129 0.133 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -1006.12 -1001.02 
Number of Observations 139,309 139,309 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All the continuous variables above are standardized for better 




Table 2.2. Continued 
  Model 













vs. no deal 
High tech. 
uncertainty  
vs. no deal 
Tech.-only 
vs. no deal 
Tech.-plus 
vs. no deal 
Hypothesis tested H2 H2 H3 H3 
Mutual Forbearance Potential 0.017** 0.031*** 0.018** 0.031*** 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Size (Max) 0.322*** 0.548*** 0.407*** 0.431*** 
  (0.096) (0.117) (0.107) (0.101) 
Ratio of Size 0.097 0.137 0.114 0.127 
  (0.155) (0.168) (0.163) (0.157) 
Patent Count (Max) 0.176* 0.015 0.136 0.084 
  (0.091) (0.100) (0.092) (0.101) 
Ratio of Patent Count 0.115 0.164 0.124 0.163 
  (0.123) (0.143) (0.125) (0.140) 
Class Count (Max) 0.270** 0.108 0.115 0.318** 
  (0.119) (0.136) (0.125) (0.128) 
Ratio of Class Count 0.201* 0.290** 0.167 0.335*** 
  (0.121) (0.124) (0.120) (0.126) 
Common Citation Rate 0.026* 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.033* 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) 
Cross-citation Rate  0.000 0.040*** -0.005 0.038*** 
  (0.041) (0.011) (0.059) (0.010) 
Increment of H-index 0.028 0.038* 0.049*** -0.001 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.027) 
International Deal -1.180*** -0.839** -1.262*** -0.732** 
  (0.262) (0.340) (0.275) (0.332) 
Private (Bigger Firm) -1.319*** -0.048 -0.458 -0.897* 
  (0.495) (0.381) (0.378) (0.458) 
Private (Smaller Firm) -1.726*** -1.290*** -1.921*** -1.189*** 
  (0.358) (0.356) (0.398) (0.331) 
Constant -6.741*** -7.099*** -6.850*** -7.000*** 
  (0.452) (0.481) (0.488) (0.458) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
H2/H3: Chi-square (1) 5.16** 4.15** 
Wald Chi-square (df)  626.46*** (38) 601.05*** (38) 
Pseudo R-square 0.130 0.128 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -1092.14 -1095.55 
Number of Observations 139,309 139,309 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All the continuous variables above are standardized for better 





2.4.1 Supplemental Analyses 
Table 2.3 shows the results from logit models using penalized likelihood 
estimation (so-called Firth logit models) to control for rare event bias (Firth, 1993). As 
shown in Model 2, the positive effect of mutual forbearance potential on the likelihood of 
technology cooperation being formed is still supported (b=0.021 and p<0.01).   
I also re-tested all the hypotheses using random-effects specifications to control 
for unobservable heterogeneity. As shown in Table 2.4, random-effects probit models and 
random-effects multinomial logit models were employed. Although random-effects were 
significant in all the models, the results were consistent with the main results in Table 
2.2. 
Finally, since licensing agreements can be less prone to contractual hazards 
compared to other types of technology collaborations, I examined whether the findings 
are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of these agreements and the results are shown 
in Table 2.5. Treating licensing agreements as non-realized deals and using random 
effects models, the estimation results are consistent with the main results in Table 2.2. It 
therefore appears that consideration of the small number of realized deals among 
potential transactions, unobserved heterogeneity, and forms of technology cooperation 







Table 2.3. Penalized Likelihood Estimation Results (Firth Logit Models) 
 Model 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Tech. Cooperation Tech. Cooperation 
Mutual Forbearance Potential  0.021*** 
   (0.006) 
Size (Max) 0.412*** 0.409*** 
  (0.076) (0.076) 
Ratio of Size 0.118 0.114 
  (0.107) (0.108) 
Patent Count (Max) 0.122* 0.111* 
  (0.062) (0.064) 
Ratio of Patent Count 0.152 0.139 
  (0.103) (0.104) 
Class Count (Max) 0.202** 0.207** 
  (0.097) (0.097) 
Ratio of Class Count 0.250*** 0.239*** 
  (0.083) (0.084) 
Common Citation Rate 0.038*** 0.038*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) 
Cross-citation Rate  0.039*** 0.039*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
Increment of H-index 0.032* 0.033* 
  (0.018) (0.018) 
International Deal -1.042*** -1.055*** 
  (0.200) (0.200) 
Private (Bigger Firm) -0.633** -0.621** 
  (0.282) (0.282) 
Private (Smaller Firm) -1.500*** -1.494*** 
 (0.247) (0.247) 
Constant -5.692*** -5.687*** 
 (0.284) (0.284) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Wald Chi-square (df) 376.92*** (18) 390.31*** (19) 
Penalized Log Likelihood -966.3 -956.6 
Number of Observations 139,309 139,309 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All the continuous variables above are standardized for better 




Table 2.4. Random-effects Probit and Multinomial Logit Results 
 Model 






Dependent Variable Tech. Cooperation Tech. Cooperation 
Hypothesis tested H1 H1 
Mutual Forbearance Potential  0.014*** 
   (0.002) 
Size (Max) 0.159*** 0.158*** 
  (0.035) (0.034) 
Ratio of Size 0.057 0.055 
  (0.046) (0.046) 
Patent Count (Max) 0.055** 0.051* 
  (0.027) (0.028) 
Ratio of Patent Count 0.041 0.038 
  (0.038) (0.038) 
Class Count (Max) 0.095** 0.094** 
  (0.039) (0.038) 
Ratio of Class Count 0.076** 0.072** 
  (0.037) (0.036) 
Common Citation Rate 0.024*** 0.024*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
Cross-citation Rate  0.014* 0.014* 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
Increment of H-index 0.030*** 0.030*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
International Deal -0.451*** -0.449*** 
  (0.096) (0.096) 
Private (Bigger Firm) -0.258** -0.253** 
  (0.117) (0.116) 
Private (Smaller Firm) -0.526*** -0.520*** 
 (0.100) (0.099) 
Constant -3.583*** -3.571*** 
 (0.203) (0.207) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Rho 0.367*** 0.356*** 
 (0.055) (0.057) 
Wald Chi-square (df) 158.45*** (18) 162.22*** (19) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -944.04 -940.79 
Number of Observations 139,300 139,300 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. All the 
continuous variables above are standardized for better presentation. Since random-effects models allow 
only one observation for a certain dyad in a certain year, only one observation is randomly selected when 




Table 2.4. Continued 
 Model 





















vs. no deal 
High tech. 
uncertainty 
vs. no deal 
Tech.-only 
vs. no deal 
 
Tech.-plus 
vs. no deal 
 
Hypothesis tested H2 H2 H3 H3 
Mutual Forbearance Potential 0.018** 0.031*** 0.019** 0.030*** 
  (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Size (Max) 0.320*** 0.555*** 0.393*** 0.445*** 
  (0.108) (0.137) (0.120) (0.117) 
Ratio of Size 0.111 0.190 0.130 0.171 
  (0.159) (0.176) (0.169) (0.173) 
Patent Count (Max) 0.200** 0.039 0.154* 0.111 
  (0.097) (0.096) (0.091) (0.103) 
Ratio of Patent Count 0.101 0.147 0.109 0.146 
  (0.136) (0.152) (0.129) (0.152) 
Class Count (Max) 0.309** 0.175 0.151 0.386*** 
  (0.130) (0.157) (0.135) (0.144) 
Ratio of Class Count 0.149 0.254* 0.107 0.304** 
  (0.129) (0.135) (0.130) (0.134) 
Common Citation Rate 0.043* 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.047* 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) 
Cross-citation Rate  -0.013 0.039** -0.025 0.038** 
  (0.056) (0.019) (0.105) (0.017) 
Increment of H-index 0.056* 0.062** 0.084*** 0.011 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) (0.036) 
International Deal -1.307*** -0.988*** -1.423*** -0.843** 
  (0.292) (0.352) (0.291) (0.356) 
Private (Bigger Firm) -1.340** -0.137 -0.480 -1.061** 
  (0.582) (0.444) (0.420) (0.490) 
Private (Smaller Firm) -1.711*** -1.205*** -1.876*** -1.136*** 
 (0.367) (0.366) (0.405) (0.341) 
Constant -8.475*** -8.808*** -8.583*** -8.751*** 
 (0.634) (0.650) (0.681) (0.611) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
Variance(Random Effect) 3.580*** (0.831) 3.610*** (0.820) 
H2/H3: Chi-square (1) 5.81**  3.98** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1027.72 -1030.74 
Number of Observations 139,300 139,300 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. All the 
continuous variables above are standardized for better presentation. Since random-effects models allow 
only one observation for a certain dyad in a certain year, only one observation is randomly selected when 




Table 2.5. Random-effects Probit/Multinomial Logit Results Excluding Licensing 
Agreements 
 Model 






Dependent Variable Tech. Cooperation Tech. Cooperation 
Hypothesis tested H1 H1 
Mutual Forbearance Potential  0.016*** 
   (0.002) 
Size (Max) 0.280*** 0.277*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) 
Ratio of Size 0.168*** 0.164*** 
  (0.064) (0.063) 
Patent Count (Max) -0.016 -0.030 
  (0.041) (0.043) 
Ratio of Patent Count 0.160*** 0.151*** 
  (0.056) (0.054) 
Class Count (Max) 0.021 0.020 
  (0.060) (0.059) 
Ratio of Class Count 0.019 0.010 
  (0.054) (0.052) 
Common Citation Rate 0.023** 0.022** 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
Cross-citation Rate  0.007 0.007 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Increment of H-index 0.019 0.019 
  (0.012) (0.012) 
International Deal -0.274* -0.271** 
  (0.141) (0.138) 
Private (Bigger Firm) -0.498** -0.479** 
  (0.196) (0.189) 
Private (Smaller Firm) -0.385*** -0.374*** 
 (0.145) (0.142) 
Constant -4.139*** -4.086*** 
 (0.377) (0.392) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Rho 0.421*** 0.397*** 
 (.091) (0.099) 
Wald Chi-square (df) 68.53*** (18) 71.90*** (19) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -422.11 -418.39 
Number of Observations 139,300 139,300 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. All the 
continuous variables above are standardized for better presentation. Since random-effects models allow 
only one observation for a certain dyad in a certain year, only one observation is randomly selected when 




Table 2.5 Continued 
 Model 





















vs. no deal 
High tech. 
uncertainty 
vs. no deal 
Tech.-only 
vs. no deal 
 
Tech.-plus 
vs. no deal 
 
Hypothesis tested H2 H2 H3 H3 
Mutual Forbearance Potential 0.020* 0.041*** 0.023** 0.037*** 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) 
Size (Max) 0.579*** 1.135*** 0.706*** 0.842*** 
  (0.154) (0.216) (0.179) (0.182) 
Ratio of Size 0.445** 0.516* 0.491** 0.437 
  (0.202) (0.302) (0.213) (0.313) 
Patent Count (Max) -0.063 -0.115 -0.107 -0.022 
  (0.129) (0.202) (0.169) (0.141) 
Ratio of Patent Count 0.430** 0.488** 0.392** 0.551** 
  (0.178) (0.232) (0.181) (0.216) 
Class Count (Max) 0.329 -0.443* 0.051 0.090 
  (0.207) (0.237) (0.207) (0.279) 
Ratio of Class Count 0.213 -0.252 0.160 -0.127 
  (0.160) (0.262) (0.167) (0.247) 
Common Citation Rate 0.052** 0.037 0.067*** 0.004 
  (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.031) 
Cross-citation Rate  0.020 0.015 0.019 0.021* 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.011) 
Increment of H-index 0.034 0.028 0.062* -0.071 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.061) 
International Deal -0.644 -0.840 -0.937** -0.340 
  (0.462) (0.543) (0.444) (0.602) 
Private (Bigger Firm) -19.831*** 0.036 -1.387* -1.298* 
  (0.271) (0.712) (0.708) (0.705) 
Private (Smaller Firm) -1.276** -0.939 -1.222** -1.063* 
 (0.502) (0.600) (0.507) (0.590) 
Constant -9.532*** -10.926*** -10.038*** -10.312*** 
 (0.958) (1.355) (1.075) (1.283) 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
Variance(Random Effect) 4.292*** (1.680) 4.478*** (1.796) 
H2/H3: Chi-square (1) 8.36***  4.11** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -443.48 -442.63 
Number of Observations 139,300 139,300 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. All the 
continuous variables above are standardized for better presentation. Since random-effects models allow 
only one observation for a certain dyad in a certain year, only one observation is randomly selected when 





2.5.1 Contributions and Implications 
This paper makes several theoretical contributions to the alliance literature in 
general and the specific stream of research on partner selection in particular. First, at the 
broadest level, my theory and results offer new interpretations and implications for 
market overlap and interfirm collaborations. As Gulati (1999: 397) has argued, in the 
alliance literature “the primary focus has been on understanding some of the resource-
based considerations that promote the formation of alliances.” In particular, drawing on 
the resource-based view (or resource dependence theory) and population ecology, the 
alliance literature has typically argued that market overlap between potential partners 
makes collaborations between them unlikely. This is because firms competing in the 
same market niches are similar in terms of resources and capabilities (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977) and this lack of complementarity reduces their strategic interdependence 
and, in turn, motivation to cooperate (Richardson, 1972). Along similar lines, previous 
studies in the alliance literature have often measured complementarity between firms by 
counting non-overlapping niches and also have tested the negative effect of market (or 
niche) overlap on collaborations (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995a; Rothaermel & 
Boeker, 2008).  
However, by aiming to bridge the literatures on multimarket competition and 
interfirm collaboration, I offer a new theoretical logic for the linkage between market 
overlap and partner selection. I have demonstrated that market overlap can facilitate 
technology cooperation and have identified a new mechanism for why partners can find 
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cooperative agreements with rivals attractive:  market overlap generates mutual 
forbearance from opportunism. Although my new arguments and the conventional view 
make the opposite predictions about the relationship between market overlap and 
technology cooperation, I see the different perspectives as being complementary rather 
than incompatible with each other. They consider different theoretical mechanisms 
shaping the attractiveness of partners (i.e., based on resource/capability endowments and 
likelihood of opportunism), so the positive and negative effects of market overlap can co-
exist in theory. Furthermore, recent work on partner selection in the alliance literature 
highlights that the relative importance of criteria for partner selection such as resource 
complementarity and the risk of opportunism varies depending on alliance context. For 
example, Shah and Swaminathan (2008) argued that when “outcome interpretability” and 
“process manageability” are both low, trust becomes a key criterion for partner selection. 
Because my theory and results are based on technology cooperation where outcome 
interpretability and process manageability both are low, this can explain the net positive 
effect of market overlap for the technology partnerships I study. It would be valuable in 
future research to identify specific conditions under which market overlap has a negative 
effect on technology cooperation based upon resource considerations rather than mutual 
forbearance potential. Such research holds the potential to determine the importance of 
the new motive for partner selection I have identified compared to other criteria that 
prospective collaborators employ (Ariño & Ring, 2010; Gimeno, 2004; Hitt et al., 2004; 




 Second, my theoretical arguments for market overlap and the risk of opportunism 
enrich the conventional view on the competitive aspect of cooperation by considering the 
cost side of opportunistic behaviors in partnerships. The literature has mainly argued that 
competitive relationships in end-product markets aggravate hazards of cooperation by 
increasing the benefit to a firm engaging in opportunism (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park 
& Russo, 1996). Above all, opportunistic behaviors in a partnership with an end-product 
market rival can directly hurt the rival in a zero-sum game. In addition, although perfect 
cooperation within the partnership may make the goal of the partnership more likely to be 
achieved, the outcomes by perfect cooperation within the partnership improve the 
competitiveness of the rivals equally, which decreases the incentive for perfect 
cooperation relative to opportunistic action (Khanna et al., 1998). In addition to this 
conventional view focusing on the immediate pay-off from opportunistic behavior, I 
suggest that it is also valuable to consider the multi-period consequences of initial 
opportunism, including the responses by the counterpart in the markets in which the firms 
compete. If a partner can retaliate against opportunistic action of a firm in multiple 
markets, the cost of the initial opportunistic action will increase, making the net benefit 
unclear once such costs are considered. By applying this simple idea from the 
multimarket competition literature to the partnership context, I suggest that the effects of 
competition between partners outside an alliance on behavior within an alliance is more 




2.5.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study also has a number of specific limitations that extensions to this 
research might address. To begin with, my study considers technology cooperation in 
biopharmaceuticals, so it would be interesting to investigate other forms of collaborative 
agreements in other industry contexts to probe the generalizability of my findings. Such 
research could be valuable to ascertain the importance of market overlap and mutual 
forbearance from opportunism relative to other partner selection criteria in other 
collaborative contexts. 
 Along similar lines, it is important to note that the market domain of a firm is 
defined by two theoretical dimensions—the product market dimension and geographical 
dimension (Jayachandran et al., 1999). Therefore, strictly speaking, multimarket contact 
should be measured taking the two dimensions into account simultaneously. Due to data 
limitations to do both at once, this paper considers the product market dimension only 
and thus the results of this paper would be weakened if the sample firms are not 
overlapping in their geographical market domains. To mitigate this concern, based on 
interviews with industry experts, I have focused on the top 200 global firms in 
biopharmaceuticals as these firms sell their products in major foreign countries and have 
the financial wherewithal to bear the cost of going through expensive approval 
procedures in foreign countries. It would therefore be valuable to investigate 
heterogeneity in firms’ geographic markets to consider this potential boundary condition 
for mutual forbearance in promoting technology cooperation. 
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Moreover, future research might investigate how overlap in end-product markets 
interacts with overlap in factor markets to influence mutual forbearance and partner 
selection for cooperation. Since factor market overlap between two firms may imply 
resource similarity between them, the resource complementarity view might predict that 
factor market overlap will demotivate partnerships between them. By contrast, 
Jayachandran and colleagues (1999) argued that resource similarity facilitates a 
cooperative arrangement, such as mutual forbearance, by increasing the credibility of 
retaliation expectations. Later, Markman and colleagues (2009) also claimed that when 
two firms are highly overlapped both in end-product markets and factor markets, their 
awareness of the benefit from and motivation for mutual forbearance are both the highest. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate which effect is more salient under what 
conditions. 
Given that I only consider partner selection in the current study, it would be natural and 
interesting extension of this study to investigate how the mutual forbearance from 
opportunism between multimarket rivals affects other collaboration-related decisions and 
outcomes. There are many opportunities to bring the multimarket competition literature 
into different streams of research on alliances. For instance, future studies might examine 
how mutual forbearance potential and firms’ cooperative history jointly have an impact 
on governance choices, alliance design, conflicts between partners, and knowledge 
transfers or other outcomes of interfirm collaborations. It would be interesting to consider 
whether multimarket rivals design incentives and administrative controls in collaborative 
agreements differently from other partners, given the shadow of the future cast on such 
collaborations. It might also be that such collaborations are subject to different dynamics 
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than other alliances not embedded in a competitive context offering the potential for 
mutual forbearance from opportunism. Such research could examine whether and how 
firms retaliate against opportunism in alliances in their shared markets and vice-versa. 
Finally, my study has only examined the formation phase of alliances and is silent on the 
execution of technology partnerships as well as the performance consequences of 
alliances formed between multimarket rivals. Therefore, future research might examine 
whether the success or failure of collaborations (Park & Russo, 1996) or the intended 
transfer of (or unintended leakage of ) know-how (Oxley & Wada, 2009) in technology 
partnerships are apt to be affected by mutual forbearance from opportunism. Many 
opportunities therefore exist to examine the interplay of collaboration and multimarket 





CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF MULTIMARKET CONTACT ON THE GOVERNANCE 
OF R&D ALLIANCES 
3.1 Introduction 
In the alliance literature, governance structure choice has been regarded as one of 
the most important decisions that firms have to undertake for their collaborative 
agreements (Li et al., 2008). Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been a primary 
theoretical foundation in the literature on alliance governance. At the same time, 
however, its exclusive focus on transactional attributes and related contractual hazards as 
determinants of governance structures has been criticized by scholars who emphasize that 
the broader social context in which a transaction is embedded also crucially influences 
governance choice (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Jones, Hesterly, & 
Borgatti, 1997). In particular, the stream of research on relational embeddedness has 
showed that in general previous cooperative relationships between alliance partners 
mitigate the risk of opportunism by partners and thus reduce the need for hierarchical 
governance structures for their collaborations (Gulati, 1995b).   
It is noteworthy that the alliance governance literature has not achieved 
comparable progress regarding how competitive relationships between alliance partners 
influence the decisions concerning alliances and their governance. This is an important 
research gap because the competitive relationships a firm has with its potential partners—
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both in product markets as well as in factor markets—are among the most important 
contextual conditions that firms consider for their collaborations. Furthermore, I know 
little about how these different types of dyadic relationships that alliance partners have 
outside an alliance (i.e., competitive relationships in product and factor markets and other 
cooperative relationships) jointly affect the governance of alliances.  Indeed, some 
previous work, though scant, has addressed competition between alliance partners and the 
competitive context of inter-firm collaboration (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; 
Hamel et al., 1989; Khanna et al., 1998). However, this research has not focused upon 
how different competitive relationships between alliance partners might affect alliance 
governance. More importantly, previous research has emphasized that market overlap 
between alliance partners incentivizes them to behave opportunistically by increasing the 
pay-off from such behavior (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996). However, 
based on the multimarket competition literature, I can build upon and extend this 
argument by taking into account possible future competitive responses by alliance 
partners and therefore the consequential costs of behaving opportunistically.  
The multimarket competition literature has theorized and corroborated that as two 
firms encounter each other in more markets, or have a higher level of multimarket 
contact,6 they mutually forbear from competitive attacks for fear of broad retaliation by 
the attacked firm across the multiple shared markets (Baum & Korn, 1996; Evans & 
Kessides, 1994; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000; Phillips & 
Mason, 1996). Accordingly, in R&D alliances featuring concerns about opportunism by 
                                                 
6 In this paper, I use the terms market overlap, (multi)market contact, and shared markets interchangeably.  
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partners (Pisano, 1989), multimarket contact between partner firms might also curb 
opportunistic behavior, since opportunism is also a form of competitive action to 
appropriate value in an R&D collaboration. For this reason, shared markets between 
R&D partners can enhance incentive alignment, thus making the R&D alliance less likely 
to be governed by hierarchical governance structures that the alliance governance 
literature has long suggested as remedies for opportunism.  
Furthermore, I also pay attention to other types of dyadic relationships alliance 
partners have outside an alliance in addition to rivalry in end-product markets.  Alliance 
partners may encounter each other not only in end-product markets, but also in factor 
markets. In addition, they may be embedded in prior cooperative relationships, so there is 
an opportunity to consider the competitive and cooperative context of an alliance 
agreement at the same time. Drawing on the multimarket competition literature on factor 
market rivalry and the literature on relational embeddedness respectively, I claim that 
competition in factor markets intensifies the mutual forbearance from opportunism that 
multimarket contact in end-product markets generates. I also develop the theoretical 
argument that there is a substituting relationship between previous cooperative 
experience and multimarket contact in determining the expected level of opportunism by 
partners.  
By theorizing upon how different dyadic relationships located outside an alliance 
affect incentive alignment and governance choice, I make several contributions to 
research on alliance governance as well as to the multimarket competition literature. 
Beyond joining these two streams of research that have previously developed separately, 
I contribute to the literature on the competitive aspects of collaborations by suggesting 
54 
 
that overlap across markets can reduce the risk of opportunism by increasing its cost. My 
study therefore offers a novel and more complete perspective on how the competitive 
context of collaboration affects alliance governance choice. My theory emphasizes that 
competition does not always undermine cooperation. Also, my theory and results 
contribute to an understanding of how three different dyadic relationships between 
alliance partners, i.e., end-product market rivalry, factor market rivalry, and prior 
collaborative relationships, interplay with one another in influencing partners’ alliance 
governance choices.  
I also contribute to the multimarket competition literature by proposing that 
market contact can influence firms’ decisions through efficiency considerations, rather 
than market power considerations. Previous studies on multimarket competition have 
interpreted mutual forbearance as tacit collusion, which enables firms to obtain 
monopolistic rents (Jayachandran et al., 1999; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2013). However, by 
emphasizing how multimarket contact can generate mutual forbearance that can support 
the governance of alliances through incentive alignment, my arguments and findings 
suggest that multimarket contact can also enhance transactional efficiency, broadening 
the domains to which mutual forbearance through multimarket competition can apply. 
 
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Multimarket Contact and Alliance Governance 
In the study of inter-organizational collaboration, misaligned incentives and the 
consequential opportunism have been a central theme in multiple theoretical traditions 
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such as organizational economics (Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989), the social-structural 
perspective (Gulati, 1995b; Robinson & Stuart, 2007), and the social-psychological trust-
based perspective (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998) 
(Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012). However, despite the probable impact of 
competitive relationships between alliance partners on their incentive alignment, previous 
research has not paid systematic attention to this issue.  
Though scant, some existing research that Chen (2008) named as the 
“competition-oriented cooperation” literature has examined the tension between 
competition and cooperation and how competition between alliance partners affect their 
decisions upon alliances and collaboration outcomes. For example, Oxley and Sampson 
(2004) posited that in R&D alliances market overlap between partner firms reduces the 
likelihood of a broad alliance scope including manufacturing and marketing in addition to 
R&D activities. Park and Russo (1996) also showed that joint ventures between direct 
competitors are more likely to fail than those in which partners do not compete. These 
previous studies were based on the argument that competition in end-product markets, or 
market overlap between alliance partners, incentivizes alliance partners to 
opportunistically behave by increasing the pay-off from such behaviors. Competition 
outside an alliance effectively makes the collaboration a zero-sum game (Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004). Also, existing research has considered whether or not alliance partners 
are present in the same end-product markets to conceptualize direct competition between 
them. Although this formulation captures the competitive tension that exists between 
alliance partners, it does not distinguish the nature and breadth of partners’ competitive 
relationships, which carry different consequences for partners’ incentives and alliance 
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governance. As I will argue below, appreciation of the number of market contacts sheds 
new light on the cost of opportunism in alliances and the implications this has for alliance 
governance. 
When firms decide whether or not to undertake an action such as opportunistic 
behavior in alliances, they evaluate the benefits and costs of the action. Since rivals react 
to the actions taken by each other, expected costs of an opportunistic behavior should 
include the damage that the rivals’ response would entail. The multimarket competition 
literature is a research stream that has focused on investigating the competitive actions 
and responses between multimarket rivals (see Jayachandran et al. (1999) and Yu & 
Cannella Jr. (2013) for reviews). To my knowledge, this literature has not examined the 
effect of multimarket contact on alliance governance. However, as I will demonstrate, 
this literature would predict that multimarket contact between alliance partners 
discourages opportunistic behavior by increasing its cost and thereby makes hierarchical 
governance modes less likely to be needed for an alliance. This is opposite to the existing 
view in the alliance literature that market overlap increases the likelihood of hierarchical 
governance mode due to aggravated contractual hazards, regardless of the number of 
market contacts (Oxley & Sampson, 2004).     
The core concept of the multimarket competition literature is the so-called mutual 
forbearance hypothesis—as two firms share more markets, they tend to mutually forbear 
from attacks, therefore lowering the intensity of rivalry (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; 
Edwards, 1955). The reason why mutual forbearance takes place is that multimarket 
rivals appreciate that an attack taken in one market may provoke broad retaliation by the 
attacked firms, so competitive responses would occur not only in the market where the 
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attack was initiated but also in other shared markets. As a consequence, the attacking firm 
may incur a larger loss than the gain from the initial attack (Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985). 
Many previous empirical studies have shown that mutual forbearance between 
multimarket rivals attenuates rivalry, as indicated by higher prices (Gimeno & Woo, 
1996; Hannan & Prager, 2004), higher profitability (Hannan & Prager, 2009; Parker & 
Röller, 1997), lower entry and exit rates (Baum & Korn, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 
2006), greater stability of market shares (Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Sandler, 1988), 
less frequent competitive behavior (Young et al., 2000; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2007), lower 
service quality (Prince & Simon, 2009), and smaller investments in tangible and 
intangible resources (Kang et al., 2010; Shankar, 1999).   
The multimarket competition literature also argues that as two firms share more 
markets (i.e., have a higher level of multimarket contact), mutual forbearance between 
them becomes stronger. This is because multimarket contact enhances two conditions that 
are required for mutual forbearance: (1) deterrence from attacks (Bernheim & Whinston, 
1990; Edwards, 1955) and (2) mutual understanding of rivals’ capabilities and strategies 
and consequently an appreciation of their interdependence (Baum & Korn, 1996). 
Deterrence between two firms is proportional to the degree of multimarket contact 
between them because more shared markets provide a greater ability, as well as more 
opportunities, to retaliate against current attacks (Jayachandran et al., 1999). Multimarket 
contact also promotes mutual forbearance by helping multimarket rivals to recognize that 
their market prospects are highly interdependent, and that they can be better off by 
mutually forbearing from rather than initiating attacks. For two firms to appreciate this 
interdependence and implicitly agree on mutual forbearance, both firms should have a 
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high level of awareness of each other’s capabilities, tactics and strategies, and reputation 
for retaliation. This high level of mutual awareness is more likely to be achieved as two 
firms encounter each other in more markets (Jayachandran et al., 1999).  
Opportunistic behaviors are also a kind of competitive action that alliance 
partners can take within an alliance itself. Just as mutual forbearance deters rivals from 
taking aggressive actions such as price cuts and market entry, it can also curb 
opportunism in alliances. That is, the possibility of broad retaliation increases the 
expected cost of the opportunistic behaviors and thereby reduces the incentives for 
alliance partners to behave opportunistically. Accordingly, as two R&D alliance partners 
share more markets, they tend to have stronger deterrence and better understanding of 
their interdependence and, as a result, are more likely to mutually forbear from behaving 
opportunistically; therefore, two R&D alliance partners with a higher level of 
multimarket contact have a lower concern about opportunism by partners. 
The alliance governance literature has long argued that hierarchical governance 
structures involving equity arrangements effectively mitigate the risk of partners’ 
opportunism by enhancing monitoring, control, and incentive alignment (Kogut, 1988; 
Pisano, 1989). Despite these benefits, however, the high costs associated with 
establishing and maintaining hierarchical governance structures justify alliance partners’ 
employing those remedies only when the expected level of opportunism by partners is 
substantial. Consistently, since two potential R&D alliance partners who share more 
markets are more likely to mutually forbear from opportunism, they have a lesser need to 
choose hierarchical governance modes to alleviate the risk of opportunism. By contrast, 
when such mutual forbearance from opportunism is not available due to lower levels of 
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multimarket contact, they will be more likely to need the benefits of monitoring, control, 
and incentive alignment that hierarchical governance structures provide. I therefore posit:        
Hypothesis 1. As two partner firms to an R&D collaboration have a higher level 
of multimarket contact, the likelihood of the partners employing a 
more hierarchical governance structure decreases. 
 
3.2.2 Other Competitive and Cooperative Relationships between Partners 
I have argued that multimarket contact between alliance partners effectively 
substitutes for hierarchical governance structures by generating mutual forbearance from 
opportunism in R&D collaborations. Although I have focused on competitive 
relationships between alliance partners in end-product markets, they may also have 
different dyadic relationships between them. That is, they may compete against each 
other in factor markets as well, just as they might also be embedded in pre-existing 
cooperative relationships. Given that the relational context in which alliance partners are 
embedded might affect their incentive alignment, the interplay between different types of 
dyadic relationships is worth investigating to have a more complete and comprehensive 
understanding of the effects of dyadic relationships alliance partners have outside an 
alliance on their governance choice. As I argue below, these other competitive and 
cooperative relationships between partners represent important boundary conditions for 




More specifically, if factor market competition makes multimarket contact more 
or less likely to generate mutual forbearance or if cooperative relationships affect the 
expected level of opportunism between alliance partners, these interfirm relationships 
will also shape the efficacy of multimarket contact as a remedy for opportunism and 
hence partners’ reliance on hierarchical governance structures. Therefore, drawing on 
recent work in the multimarket competition literature that examines how factor market 
rivalry affects mutual forbearance (Markman et al., 2009), I examine how firms’ pursuit 
of similar or different technological resources reinforces or dampens the effect of 
multimarket contact on alliance governance choice in R&D collaborations. In addition, 
drawing on previous research on relational embeddedness (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati, 1995b), 
I investigate how the substituting effect of multimarket contact for hierarchical 
governance structures becomes stronger or weaker for partners having previous 
collaborations with each other.  
Moderating effect of technology overlap. While the multimarket competition 
literature has predominantly emphasized competition in end-product markets, firms also 
compete in factor markets (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and overlap in factor markets may 
likewise affect mutual forbearance by reinforcing deterrence from attacks and mutual 
understanding of firms’ interdependence (Markman et al., 2009). Since firms may rely on 
different factors to produce the same or substituting products, even rivals in the same 
end-product markets have different levels of overlap in factor markets between each 
other. Given the same number of end-product market contacts, overlap in factor markets 
provides extra contacts between firms. Since these extra contacts can promote deterrence 
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and understanding of interdependence between multimarket rivals, overlap in factor 
markets reinforces mutual forbearance between them.   
Deterrence from attacks becomes stronger as two firms have greater overlap in 
factor markets in addition to end-product markets because the contacts in factor markets 
also provide better ability and more opportunities to retaliate against current attacks. 
Simultaneous retaliation in both end-product and factor markets can damage the attacker 
more seriously. Also, even when retaliation in end-product markets is prohibitively 
costly, firms sharing factor markets still can retaliate in different factor markets 
(Markman et al., 2009). For instance, they can seize the top talent or important 
specialized input suppliers of the attacking firms. In addition, encounters in factor 
markets enhance partners’ understanding of each other’s capabilities and strategies that 
support their positions in end product markets (Porter, 1980: 47–71). It also makes them 
conceive of each other as more significant competitors and therefore pay more attention 
to each other (Porac & Thomas, 1990; Reger & Huff, 1993). For these reasons, overlap in 
factor markets helps multimarket rivals in end-product markets better understand their 
interdependence.  
In high-technology industries, the most important strategic factor to determine 
competitive advantages is technology (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999). Therefore, technology 
overlap between two firms is the most critical aspect of factor market rivalry between 
them (DeCarolis, 2003). Since the trajectories of technology development in firms tend to 
be path-dependent (Coombs & Hull, 1998), two firms who are highly overlapped in 
technology space are likely to compete for the same pools of labor and input suppliers 
over a long period of time. Hence, technology overlap between multimarket rivals in end-
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product markets facilitates the formation of mutual forbearance from opportunism. 
Therefore, given a certain level of multimarket contact, technology overlap facilitates the 
formation of mutual forbearance from opportunism and thus further reduces the need for 
hierarchical governance structures to support R&D collaborations. I therefore posit:   
Hypothesis 2. The negative effects of multimarket contact on the usage of 
hierarchical governance in R&D alliances will be more pronounced when the 
partners have technological overlap. 
 
Moderating effect of prior ties. Although I have argued that multimarket contact 
between R&D alliance partners reduces the risk of opportunism by partners, they are also 
embedded in social networks of cooperative relationships that shape expectations of 
opportunism. When trust is defined as “a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that 
one’s exchange partner will act opportunistically (Bradach & Eccles, 1989: 104),” 
organizational researchers have argued and empirically shown that interfirm trust 
increases with repeated interactions (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Gulati & Sytch, 2008; 
Parkhe, 1993). Therefore, the number of previous experience of interactions (i.e., prior 
ties) with a potential partner is expected to reduce potential hazards of opportunism and, 
in turn, may affect the effect of multimarket contact on alliance governance choice. 
Gulati (1995a) has shown that past alliances between firms enhance the likelihood of a 
future exchange in the form of a new partnership between them, and he has also 
demonstrated that the reduced risk of opportunism leads them to opt for a non-equity 
structure rather than an equity alliance that would bring greater joint controls and 
enhanced incentive alignment through shared equity (Gulati, 1995b). 
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I argue that since multimarket contact and prior ties fulfill a redundant role of 
reducing the risk of opportunism by partners, they substitute for each other in affecting 
alliance partners’ decisions regarding remedies for such a risk. When two potential 
alliance partners have prior ties and thus expect a lower level of opportunism by partners, 
the relative contribution that multimarket contact makes to mitigating cooperation 
hazards will tend to be lower. However, when prior ties between firms are lacking and 
the risk of opportunism is greater, it can be especially beneficial to have the shadow of 
the future and mutual forbearance from opportunism emerging from multimarket contact 
to support R&D collaborations. Therefore, the substituting effect of multimarket contact 
for hierarchical governance structures is expected to be most pronounced for first-time 
collaborators exposed to a greater risk of opportunism and will diminish for firms with a 
more extensive cooperative history. I therefore posit: 
Hypothesis 3. The negative effects of multimarket contact on the usage of 




3.3.1 Data and Sample 
To empirically investigate how multimarket contact between alliance partners 
affects their governance choices for R&D alliances in high-technology industries, I used 
the global biopharmaceutical industry as my research setting, for several reasons. First, 
the biopharmaceutical industry is a high-technology industry where R&D intensity is 
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substantial. Second, market definition in this industry is very clear. Like other empirical 
work in the multimarket competition literature, in my study markets should be defined to 
ensure that two firms defined to be present in the same market actually compete against 
each other. Markets in this industry are defined by therapeutic classes that are widely-
accepted and commonly-used by U.S. government authorities and industry players (e.g., 
cholesterol regulators, antiulcerants, and antipsychotics) (Anand et al., 2009). Since 
different products in the same therapeutic class are generally substitutes for each other, 
firms offering their products in the same therapeutic class compete with each other. 
Third, alliances are frequently observed in the industry (Hagedoorn, 2002), and many 
studies of alliance governance have been carried out in biopharmaceuticals (Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Phene & Tallman, 2012; Pisano, 1989; Robinson & Stuart, 2007), which 
facilitates comparisons between my study and extant research.    
In order to examine firms’ presence in different end-product markets, I used data 
provided by IMS Health that contains prescription drug sales by therapeutic class for 
biopharmaceutical companies around the world; in the data, there were 338 distinct 
therapeutic classes and each therapeutic class was defined as a distinct market. For the 
alliance data, I relied on Thomson Reuters’ Recap database. As Schilling (2009) has 
shown, the Recap database is the most robust and representative in its coverage of 
alliances in the global biopharmaceutical industry and thus has been widely used in 
previous work on R&D collaborations in this industry (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; 
Lerner et al., 2003; Robinson & Stuart, 2007). To develop patent-related variables, I drew 
on patent data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  
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To construct my base sample, I first extracted all the R&D partnerships reported 
in the Recap database between 2007 and 2013. Using the definition of R&D partnerships 
by Hagedoorn (2002), I included contractual partnerships, such as joint R&D pacts and 
joint development agreements, and equity-based partnerships such as minority equity 
R&D partnerships and R&D joint ventures. Pure patent licensing agreements were 
excluded. Since my theory on the effects of multimarket contact on alliance governance 
is fundamentally dyadic, I excluded 167 alliances that were formed between more than 
two firms, leaving 3,523 observations in my sample. Out of the 3,523 R&D partnerships, 
201 (5.7%) were equity-based alliances, including minority equity partnerships and joint 
ventures while the remaining 3,322 (94.3%) were non-equity alliances. Then, for the 
firms involved in those R&D collaboration agreements, I examined their activities in end-




Dependent variable. The dependent variable, Equity Allianceij, takes the value of 
one if two R&D alliance partners, firm i and firm j, choose an equity-based governance 
structure (either minority investment or joint venture), and zero for non-equity deals.7 
The dependent variable therefore captures the degree of hierarchy in alliances. Equity 
involvement is the most critical control mechanism to enhance incentive alignment, 
                                                 
7 To check if there are R&D alliances where the governance modes change (e.g., from non-equity to equity 
or from equity to non-equity) in my sample, I collected all the repeated alliances between the sample 
partners and checked the detailed specifics of the alliances. To my best knowledge, however, there was no 
such case.    
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monitoring, and enforcement (Hennart, 1988; Pisano, 1989). Therefore, bifurcation of the 
hybrid governance structures on the markets-hierarchies governance continuum into non-
equity and equity alliances has been the most commonly used approach in the alliance 
governance literature (Gulati, 1995b; Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996; Li et al., 2008; Li, 
Eden, Hitt, Ireland, & Garrett, 2012; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Phene & Tallman, 2012; 
Pisano, 1989; Robinson & Stuart, 2007). I also use this categorization for clarity, 
simplicity, and comparability with previous work. In supplemental analyses presented 
below, I also follow previous research on alliance governance in biopharmaceuticals in 
separating minority equity partnerships and joint ventures (Gulati & Singh, 1998). 
Explanatory variables. The key independent variable of this study used for 
hypothesis testing is Multimarket Contactij, which measures the degree of multimarket 
contact between firm i and firm j in the year of R&D partnership. Following the literature 
(Baum & Korn, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006), I operationalize the variable as 
follows: 
                                           	
∑
∑ ∑
                
In this expression, m represents the set of markets. For market definition, I treat each 
therapeutic class (e.g., cholesterol regulator, antiulcerants, and antipsychotics) as a 
distinct end-product market. Iim (Ijm) is an indicator taking the value of one if firm i (firm 
j) is present in market m in the year of R&D partnership, and zero otherwise.  The 
multimarket contact measure represents the number of market contact between the two 
firms over the sum of the each firm’s number of markets. Many different measures for 
multimarket contact have been developed and used in the multimarket competition 
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literature. Basically, the measures are constructed from counts of market contacts, but 
different weights are often employed. Since reliability as well as discriminant and 
predictive validity have been found to differ across the measures and no consensus exists 
as to which one is best (Gimeno & Jeong, 2001), I choose this simple measure to be 
parsimonious (Gimeno & Woo, 1996).8  
 To test the moderating effects of partners’ overlap in factor markets (i.e., H2), I 
construct a measure of technology overlap, or the extent to which two alliance partners 
draw upon similar technological resources in factor markets. For this variable, I employ 
the angular measure initially developed by Jaffe (1986) that has been widely accepted 
and extensively used in the literature for this purpose (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, & 





where , , ⋯ , ,⋯ ,  and , , ⋯ , ,⋯ ,   
Given that my sampled firms have patented in 462 distinct three-digit USPTO patent 
classes,  ( ) is the number of patents that Firm i (Firm j) have applied in patent class s 
for the last ten years before the year of their R&D partnership (Benner & Waldfogel, 
2008); these patent applications are all approved in the end. Therefore, 	  represents 
Firm i (Firm j)’s distribution of patents across various patent classes. Technology Overlap 
ranges from zero to one, where values closer to one indicate greater overlap between two 
                                                 
8 For robustness check, I also used Baum and Korn's, (1999) measure weighting each market contact with 
its importance. However, the results did not change significantly (results available upon request).      
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firms in technology space. As a robustness check, I also used a five-year time window to 
count the number of patent applications, but obtained the qualitatively same results as 
those presented below.    
 To examine the potential role that partners’ cooperative history plays as a 
boundary condition for the effects of multimarket contract on R&D alliance governance 
(i.e., H3), I constructed a measure of Prior Ties by counting the number of previous 
agreements two firms in a dyad entered into in the past ten years before the focal deal. 
Including this variable in the models is also helpful for controlling the direct effects of 
previous cooperative experience on governance choice. As above, I also examined this 
variable for a five-year time-frame and found the results to be robust. 
Control variables. In addition to the above covariates, I incorporate variables in 
the models that might be related to firms’ alliance governance choices or their 
competitive relationships. First, at transaction level I control for the degree of exploration 
and the scope of the collaboration. As activities in a given R&D project are more 
explorative, appropriation concerns become stronger because adequate specification of 
property rights can be problematic (Freeman, 1997; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1991). In my 
context, the degree of exploration is well approximated by phases in new drug 
development. The new drug development process is typically categorized into discovery, 
lead molecule, formulation, preclinical, clinical phases I/II/III, and FDA approval phases 
from the beginning to the end, where earlier phases entail greater exploration (Robinson 
& Stuart, 2007). Therefore, I categorize the first four phases as early stage (i.e., high 
degree of exploration) through an indicator variable. As a robustness check, I also 
examined phase fixed effects and obtained qualitatively similar results as those presented 
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below. Also, since alliance scope has been shown to affect the level of appropriation risk 
(Oxley & Sampson, 2004), I include a dummy variable taking the value of one if a given 
R&D alliance also contains either manufacturing or marketing activities, and zero 
otherwise.  
 Although I focus on relational embeddedness (i.e., Prior Ties) for my theory 
development, the social-structural perspective in the alliance literature has found that 
structural embeddedness also affects alliance formation and governance choices (Gulati 
& Gargiulo, 1999). Since they are related concepts, controlling for structural 
embeddedness can help to show the effect of relational embeddedness on governance 
choice independent of structural embeddedness. To control for structural embeddedness, I 
used measures for indirect ties and degree centrality. To measure indirect ties, I count the 
number of indirect ties at degree distance two using the complete network in the 
biopharmaceutical field reported in the Recap database (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 
1996). Degree centrality is measured by the total number of ties the firm had entered 
within the entire industry network. Prior ties between alliance partners in a dyad were 
excluded from measuring degree centrality to ensure that the latter is independent from 
the former. Specifically, I construct two dyad-level measures, Degree Centrality (Max) 
and Ratio of Degree Centrality. While the former refers to the level of degree centrality 
of the firm who has the larger value in a dyad, the latter means the ratio of degree 
centrality of the smaller firm to that of the larger firm in the dyad.  
 I also control for some other firm-level factors that may influence their alliance 
governance choices. When a partner firm is large, equity sharing can be prohibitively 
expensive, particularly when both partners are large. Also, prior research argued that 
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asymmetrical sizes between alliance partners may affect their governance choices by 
causing more conflicts (Li et al., 2012). To control for these effects, I include in the 
model the sales of the larger firm in a given dyad (i.e., Sales (Max)) and the ratio of sales 
of the smaller firm to those of the larger firm in a given dyad (i.e., Ratio of Sales) 
(Gimeno, 2004).  
 The knowledge bases of alliance partners may also affect their decisions 
regarding governance structures. Firms with significant knowledge bases may prefer 
more hierarchical governance structures because they tend to have greater concerns about 
coordination and misappropriation (Phene & Tallman, 2012). To control for these effects, 
I construct Patent Counts (Max) and Ratio of Patent Counts. While the former counts the 
number of patents by the firm with the most patents in the dyad, the latter represents the 
ratio of patent counts (i.e., the number of patents by the firm with less patents divided by 
the number of patents by the partner). In addition, each partner’s knowledge in the 
technological areas of the given alliance can influence governance structures more than 
its overall knowledge base does. Thus, I developed Focal Knowledge (Max) and Ratio of 
Focal Knowledge. To operationalize these variables, I mapped the technological areas 
reported for each alliance in the Recap database with the three-digit USPTO patent 
classes and then based on the mapping I counted the patents applied for the past ten years 
prior to the given alliance in the relevant patent classes. Using these patent counts in the 
technological areas of the given alliance, I measure the two variables in the same way as I 
do for overall patent counts.  
 I also include three different classes of fixed effects in the models. Because the 
types of technologies and diseases involved in a focal alliance may influence the 
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governance structure of the alliance, technological domain fixed effects and disease fixed 
effects are included in the model. Finally, to capture any broader, economy-wide factors 
influencing the propensity for firms to include equity arrangements, year fixed effects are 
also included. 
 
3.3.3 Statistical Methods 
Because the dependent variable of this study, Equity Allianceij, is a binary 
variable, I use a probit regression model with robust errors as my base model. For 
robustness analyses, I use three additional statistical methods: ordered probit models, 
probit models with sample selection, and probit models with continuous endogenous 
regressors. First, although bifurcation of hybrid governance structures into equity and 
non-equity alliances is widely accepted in the literature (Gulati, 1995b; Li et al., 2008; 
Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Phene & Tallman, 2012; Pisano, 1989), this categorization of 
collaborations does not fully capture differential degrees of hierarchical control across 
different hybrid governance structures. I therefore estimated ordered probit models using 
three governance categories for the dependent variable, following Gulati and Singh 
(1998). Specifically, I categorize alliances into non-equity alliances, minority equity 
partnerships, and joint ventures. Gulati and Singh (1998) argued that joint ventures are 
more hierarchical than minority investments because the former are superior in 
monitoring and enforcement. The separate administrative hierarchy of managers in a joint 
venture not only makes detailed information on daily operations more accessible but also 
reinforces control by fiat (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Therefore, non-equity alliances, 
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minority equity partnerships, and joint ventures can be ordered in their degree of 
hierarchy from lowest to highest for the hybrid portion of the markets-hierarchies 
governance continuum.   
Second, since my sample consists of realized alliance deals only, selection bias 
may be a concern. To mitigate this concern, I use bivariate probit models with sample 
selection, which are the equivalent of Heckman's (1979) selection model except that the 
outcome equation (i.e., second-stage equation) is also a probit model. To run the first-
stage selection model, I add 10 random unrealized alliance dyads for each of the realized 
alliances in my sample. As an instrument in the first-stage model, I use the average 
number of the two partner firms’ previous licensing agreements with universities, 
following Robinson and Stuart (2007). Since partner firms licensing patents granted to 
universities may be regarded as an attractive partner, it may affect the likelihood of 
alliance formation, but it is unlikely to be related to their alliance governance structures. 
Third, I also use probit models with continuous endogenous regressors to address 
a possible alternative explanation that multimarket rivals might refrain from opportunism 
due to the high value of the collaborations between them, rather than possible retaliation. 
Some might argue that R&D collaborations between multimarket rivals could be 
extremely damaging if key knowledge is leaked to the partners and thus multimarket 
rivals partner with each other only when the upside of the partnership is substantial. This 
logic might also predict the low use of hierarchical governance structures in the R&D 
alliances between multimarket rivals because the participating firms would abstain from 
opportunistic behaviors not to ruin the high potential partnerships. That is, this logic 
suggests that the mechanism through which multimarket contact reduces the likelihood of 
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hierarchical governance modes being chosen is not the possible costs caused by 
retaliation against opportunism, but the possible costs of losing the high value 
collaboration due to opportunism. If this alternative explanation is true, my probit models 
have an endogeneity problem (more specifically, omitted variable bias) because my main 
theoretical variable (i.e., Multimarket Contact) will be (positively) correlated with the 
unobservable value of the given R&D alliance. To address this endogeneity problem, I 
run probit models with continuous endogenous variables using the logarithm of the sum 
of each partner’s number of markets as an instrument (Wooldridge, 2002). The 
requirement for the instrument variable is that it should be correlated with the degree of 
multimarket contact, but not with governance choice. When a firm is present in many 
markets, this firm is more likely to be overlapped with other firms for a simply 
probabilistic reason. Therefore, when two potential partners compete in many markets, 
they are likely to have a high level of market overlap. However, the number of markets 
where two partner firms are present is unlikely to affect their governance choice, 
especially when their sizes are controlled. 
 
3.4 Results 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables 
used in the analyses. The correlation between Multimarket Contact and Equity Alliance is 
negative and significant as predicted. Although there are many pairs of variables that 
show significant pairwise correlations, my models do not suffer from multicollinearity 
issues. The variance inflation factor for Degree Centrality (Max) is the highest (5.00), but 
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is still below the recommended cutoff level of 10 (Neter et al., 1996). Table 3.2 shows the 
results from probit regression models examining how the degree of multimarket contact 
between two alliance partners affects their alliance governance choice (Hypothesis 1) and 
how this relationship is moderated by technology overlap and prior ties (Hypothesis 2 
and 3 respectively). Model 1 contains control variables only, and Model 2 adds the direct 
effect of multimarket contact. The coefficient of Multimarket Contact in Model 2 is 
negative and significant (b=-10.98 and p<0.05), supporting Hypothesis 1. That is, as 
alliance partners have a higher level of multimarket contact, they are less likely to choose 
equity structure in their R&D collaborations. To estimate the economic significance of 
this variable, I examined how changes in Multimarket Contact affect the likelihood of 
equity alliance being chosen. Using the values of Multimarket Contact at its mean and 
mean plus one standard deviation, I calculated the response for each observation and then 
averaged those responses (Hoetker, 2007; Train, 1986). I observed that an increase in 
Multimarket Contact by one standard deviation from the mean reduces the predicted 
probability for equity arrangements by 55.2 percent. 
Models 3-7 test the moderating effects of technology overlap and prior ties. Since 
the coefficient of the interaction term between Multimarket Contact and Technology 
Overlap in Model 4 is negative and significant (b=-565.4 and p<0.01), Hypothesis 2 is 
supported. That is, the negative effect of multimarket contact on the likelihood of equity 
structure being chosen is intensified when two alliance partners are also overlapped in 
technology space. Models 5 and 6 test Hypothesis 3 predicting that the effect of 
multimarket contact on governance choice is dampened as two alliance partners have 
more previous collaborations together. The coefficient of the interaction term between 
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Multimarket Contact and Prior Ties in Model 6 is estimated to be positive and significant 
in Model 6 (b=8.413 and p<0.01) as predicted in Hypothesis 3. In addition, the results 
from Model 7 where both moderating effects of technology overlap and prior ties are 
estimated together are consistent with the individual results in Model 4 and 6. Although 
the hypothesized moderating effects are supported by the interpretation of the relevant 
coefficients, the effect—and even the sign—of an interaction also depends upon the 
coefficients of the composite variables and the values of all other variables in probit 
models (Hoetker, 2007). Therefore, I provide graphical presentations of the interaction 
effects, following Hoetker (2007). For this exercise, while I used certain values of interest 
for the explanatory variables (i.e., Multimarket Contact, Technology Overlap, and Prior 
Ties), I used observed values for all other right-hand side variables to calculate the 
average response (Hoetker, 2007; Train, 1986). The graph in Panel A (Panel B) in Figure 
3.1 shows how the relationship between Multimarket Contact and predicted probability 
for equity alliance changes depending on the values of Technology Overlap (Prior Ties). 
Specifically, when the value of Technology Overlap increases from its mean to one and 
two standard deviation above the mean, the downward slope becomes steeper, presenting 
that the negative effect of multimarket contact on the likelihood of equity alliance being 
chosen is reinforced as R&D alliance partners have a higher degree of technology 
overlap. By contrast, as the value of Prior Ties moves from zero to one and two, the 
downward slope becomes flatter in Panel B in Figure 3.1, supporting that the substituting 
effect of multimarket contact for hierarchical governance structures is weakened as two 




Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Equity Alliance 1               
(2) Multimarket Contact -0.04 1              
(3) Technology Overlap 0.02 0.17 1             
(4) Prior Ties -0.01 0.09 0.15 1            
(5) Early Stage 0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.04 1           
(6) Alliance Scope 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.07 -0.13 1          
(7) Indirect Ties -0.03 0.33 0.17 0.16 -0.04 -0.01 1         
(8) Degree Centrality (Max) 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.09 -0.01 0.27 1        
(9) Ratio of Degree Centrality -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.28 1       
(10) Size (Max) 0.03 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.18 0.55 -0.07 1      
(11) Ratio of Size -0.06 -0.09 -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.19 0.04 -0.37 1     
(12) Focal Knowledge (Max) 0.01 0.13 0.2 0.11 0.16 0.01 0.18 0.49 -0.14 0.49 -0.27 1    
(13) Ratio of Focal Knowledge -0.04 -0.06 -0.15 -0.1 -0.25 -0.02 -0.04 -0.34 0.22 -0.28 0.32 -0.33 1   
(14) Patent Counts (Max.) -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.1 0.36 -0.11 0.32 -0.23 0.37 -0.21 1  
(15) Ratio of Patent Counts -0.04 -0.01 -0.1 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0 -0.33 0.27 -0.27 0.32 -0.22 0.54 -0.22 1 
Mean 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.43 0.14 0.81 66.67 0.23 7.39 0.54 116.5 0.49 233.3 0.31 
Standard Deviation 0.23 0.04 0.26 0.38 0.50 0.35 5.87 101.2 0.34 14.30 0.49 320.4 0.48 649.0 0.43 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 1 0.41 1 5 1 1 147 450 1 61.80 1 4083 1 14533 1 





Table 3.2. Probit Regression Results 
    Models    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables H1 H1 H2 H2 H3 H3 H2 & H3
Multimarket Contact  -10.98** -10.98** -7.04 -10.68** -17.60** -11.27* 
  (5.15) (5.11) (4.47) (4.97) (8.377) (6.10) 
Technology Overlap   0.06 0.08   0.09 
   (0.14) (0.14)   (0.14) 
Multimarket Contact ×  
Technology Overlap 




Prior Ties     -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 
     (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Multimarket Contact × 
Prior Ties 






Early Stage 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Alliance Scope 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Indirect Ties -0.10** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Degree Centrality (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Degree Centrality -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Size (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Size -0.18* -0.19* -0.18* -0.18* -0.19* -0.19* -0.18* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Focal Knowledge (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Focal Knowledge 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Patent Counts (Max) -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Patent Counts -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.23** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Constant -1.27*** -1.26*** -1.27*** -1.28*** -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.28***
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -682.4 -676.5 -676.4 -674.6 -676.3 -675.9 -673.9 
Wald Chi-squared 1672.2*** 1559.4*** 1529.4*** 1708.9*** 1556.9*** 1558.7*** 1710.6***
Observations 3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 











3.4.1 Supplemental Analyses 
Table 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the results of robustness checks using ordered 
probit models, probit models with sample selection, and probit models with continuous 
endogenous regressors respectively. As shown in Table 3.3, the results from ordered 
probit models provide support to the hypotheses as before. In addition, the second cut 
point is significantly larger than the first one in all models, justifying my categorization 
scheme.  
Table 3.4 shows the results from bivariate probit models with sample selection. In 
the first-stage selection model (Model 1), the coefficient for the average number of 
licensing agreements with universities is positive and significant (b=0.05 and p<0.01). 
The Wald chi-square tests show that the selection bias is not significant in my sample. 
Furthermore, the results from the bivariate probit models with sample selection again 
lead to the same interpretations as those presented above. 
Lastly, Table 3.5 presents the results from probit models with endogenous 
regressors. The Wald test of the exogeneity of the instrumented variable (i.e., 
Multimarket Contact) does not reject the null that the instrumented variable is exogenous 
( (1)=1.27 and p=0.26), which recommends that a standard probit model is appropriate. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of Multimarket Contact is still negative and significant (b=-
15.4 and p<0.01), supporting the negative main effect of multimarket contact on the 





Table 3.3. Ordered Probit Regression Results 
    Models    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables H1 H1 H2 H2 H3 H3 H2 & H3
Multimarket Contact  -10.92** -10.91** -7.01 -10.60** -17.55** -11.22* 
  (5.11) (5.07) (4.41) (4.91) (8.27) (6.05) 
Technology Overlap   0.05 0.07   0.08 
   (0.14) (0.14)   (0.14) 
Multimarket Contact × 
Technology Overlap 




Prior Ties     -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 
     (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Multimarket Contact × 
Prior Ties 




Early Stage 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Alliance Scope 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Indirect Ties -0.10** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Degree Centrality (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Degree Centrality -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Size (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Size -0.17* -0.18* -0.18* -0.18* -0.18* -0.18* -0.18* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Focal Knowledge (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Focal Knowledge 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Patent Counts (Max) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Patent Counts -0.20* -0.20* -0.20* -0.20* -0.20* -0.21* -0.21* 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Constant cut1 1.30*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.30*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.30*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Constant cut2 2.80*** 2.81*** 2.81*** 2.82*** 2.80*** 2.81*** 2.82*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Log likelihood -708.0 -702.1 -702.1 -700.3 -701.9 -701.5 -699.5 
Wald Chi-squared 846.9*** 966.0*** 864.6*** 1127.1*** 872.1*** 908.6*** 1211.6***
Observations 3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 




Table 3.4. Probit Regression Results with Sample Selection 
    Model  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Selection Outcome 
Variables  H1 H1 H2 H2 
Multimarket Contact   -10.98** -10.95** -7.02 
   (5.17) (5.12) (4.47) 
Technology Overlap    0.07 0.09 
    (0.14) (0.14) 
Multimarket Contact ×  
Technology Overlap 
    -565.2***
(172.8) 
Early Stage  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Alliance Scope  0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Indirect Ties 7.09*** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Degree Centrality (Max) 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Degree Centrality -0.53*** -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.02) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Size (Max) 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Size -0.13*** -0.18* -0.19* -0.18* -0.18* 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Focal Knowledge (Max)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Focal Knowledge  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Patent Counts (Max) 0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Patent Counts 0.02 -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Avg. Licensing with Univ. 0.05***     
 (0.01)     
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant -1.32*** -1.32*** -1.26*** -1.28*** -1.29*** 
 (0.04) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood  -9568.5 -9562.6 -9562.5 -9560.7 
Wald Chi-squared  1544.8*** 1717.4*** 1642.7*** 1903.0*** 
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1) 









Observations  3,523 3,523 3,523 3,523 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. Even when 




Table 3.4. Continued 
  Model  
 (6) (7) (8) 
  Outcome  
Variables H3 H3 H2/H3 
Multimarket Contact -10.67** -17.62** -11.23* 
 (4.99) (8.38) (6.07) 
Technology Overlap   0.09 
   (0.14) 
Multimarket Contact × Technology Overlap
 
  -554.5*** 
(171.6) 
Prior Ties -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 






Early Stage 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Alliance Scope 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Indirect Ties -0.08** -0.09** -0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Degree Centrality (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Degree Centrality -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Size (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Size -0.19* -0.19* -0.18* 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Focal Knowledge (Max) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Focal Knowledge 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Patent Counts (Max) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ratio of Patent Counts -0.22** -0.22** -0.23** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.29*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood -9562.4 -9562.0 -9560.0 
Wald Chi-squared 1823.7*** 1723.1*** 14208*** 
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1) (p-value) 0.00 (p=0.99) 0.00 (p=0.98) 0.01 (p=0.92)  
Observations 3,523 3,523 3,523 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. Even when 
we included Multimarket Contact in the selection stage, we obtained the qualitatively same results. 
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Table 3.5. Probit Regression Results with Continuous Endogenous Regressors 
 Model 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Equity Alliance 
Multimarket 
Contact 
Multimarket Contact -15.374**  
 (5.983)  
Early Stage 0.022 -0.004*** 
 (0.082) (0.001) 
Alliance Scope 0.116 0.008*** 
 (0.105) (0.003) 
Indirect Ties -0.076* 0.002*** 
 (0.043) (0.000) 
Degree Centrality (Max) 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Ratio of Degree Centrality -0.026 0.006*** 
 (0.131) (0.002) 
Size (Max) 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of Size -0.169* 0.036*** 
 (0.101) (0.007) 
Focal Knowledge (Max) 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of Focal Knowledge -0.015 -0.003** 
 (0.088) (0.001) 
Patent Counts (Max) -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of Patent Counts -0.209* 0.002 
 (0.108) (0.001) 
Log (Sum of Num. of Markets)  0.011*** 
  (0.002) 
Constant -1.256*** -0.035*** 
 (0.154) (0.007) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood 6585.6 





Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1) 








In addition, the alternative explanation that multimarket rivals might abstain from 
opportunism not to lose their high value collaboration is based on the assumption that 
multimarket rivals normally avoid partnering with each other due to high risks and 
collaborate only when their collaboration is expected to be extremely valuable. 
Accordingly, this assumption is likely to predict that the average effect of multimarket 
contact on the likelihood of alliance formation would be negative. However, though not 
reported in Table 3.4, when I include Multimarket Contact in the first-stage selection 
equation, the coefficient of Multimarket Contact is positive and significant (b=1.50 and 
p<0.05); that is, multimarket contact promotes alliance formation. Therefore, at least in 
my sample I could conclude that the mechanism through which multimarket contact 
influences opportunism and governance choice is the possible costs caused by retaliation 
against opportunism rather than the possible costs of losing a high value collaboration 
due to opportunism.  
 
3.5 Discussion 
3.5.1 Contributions and Implications 
In broad terms, my paper’s theoretical contribution lies in bringing together the 
bodies of literature on multimarket contract as well as alliance governance, and I also 
make theoretical contributions to each of these literatures. First, my theory and findings 
contribute to the competition-cooperation research, in particular the “competition-
85 
 
oriented cooperation” literature (Chen, 2008)9 by highlighting the importance of 
considering partners’ potential competitive reactions and the number of market contacts 
between partners in predicting the effects of competition on cooperation. The 
competition-oriented cooperation literature has examined how various competitive 
attributes affect outcomes of collaborations (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; 
Dussauge et al., 2000; Harrigan, 1988; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). The main view 
in this literature has been that competitive relationships in end-product markets 
incentivize alliance partners to behave opportunistically by increasing the private benefits 
from such behaviors in alliances (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). In addition, the previous 
work has tended to rely on alliance partners’ co-presence in the same broadly-defined 
industry (e.g., at the 4-digit SIC level) to conceptualize their competitive tension in 
theory development.  
By contrast, however, my theory based on the multimarket competition literature 
argues that as alliance partners encounter each other in more end-product markets, they 
can retaliate against each other’s opportunistic behaviors across multiple markets more 
effectively and thus they tend to mutually forbear from such behaviors. That is, my 
theory emphasizes the need to take into account partners’ potential competitive reactions 
and the costs caused by them, which is made possible by accommodating the partners’ 
contacts in different end-product markets. As a consequence, I provide evidence that in 
some cases partner competition can actually support collaboration rather than undermine 
it. I conclude that competition can therefore have complex effects on alliances and the 
                                                 
9 Chen (2008) categorized competition-cooperation studies into “co-opetition,” “competition-oriented 
cooperation,” and “cooperation-oriented competition” studies.  
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governance of collaborative agreements, so I would call for more research on the 
competitive context of alliances in future studies of interfirm cooperation.  
 Second, my arguments and findings contribute to the alliance literature that 
emphasizes economic—either cooperative or competitive—relationships in which firms 
are embedded as determinants of opportunism and governance choice. While the 
literature has paid substantial attention to previous cooperative relationships, it has paid 
very little attention to competitive relationships and thus I had little understanding on 
possible interactions between different types of dyadic relationships located outside an 
alliance. My results show that when various transactional attributes related to R&D 
alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry (e.g., development phases, scope, 
technologies, and diseases) are controlled, mutual forbearance generated by multimarket 
contact (i.e., competition between partners outside an alliance) can substitute for 
hierarchical governance structures as remedies for opportunism; furthermore, this 
substituting relationship is intensified and dampened by rivalry in factor markets (i.e., 
technology space in my case) and prior collaborative experience respectively. The 
broader competitive and cooperative context of a given alliance therefore determines the 
implications of multimarket contact on alliance governance.  It would be valuable in 
future research to give more attention to the competitive context of collaboration and its 
interplay with cooperative relationships between firms.  This point also motivates more 
research integrating the cooperative strategy literature and the competitive strategy 
literature, which have tended to develop separately in recent years.     
 Finally, my theory and evidence contribute to the multimarket competition 
literature by developing novel implications of multimarket contact and the mutual 
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forbearance it creates. Previous work in the multimarket competition has entirely 
regarded mutual forbearance as tacit collusion that takes place across markets 
(Jayachandran et al., 1999; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2013), in other words, firms’ 
“subordination in their rivals’ territories in exchange for the rivals’ subordination in the 
firms’ important markets (Gimeno, 1999).” Accordingly, from the conventional 
viewpoint, the motivation behind mutual forbearance is monopolistic rent seeking.  The 
empirical research in this literature is constituent with this focus by emphasizing 
collusive outcomes of multimarket contact such as higher prices (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; 
Hannan & Prager, 2004), higher profitability (Hannan & Prager, 2009; Parker & Röller, 
1997), and greater stability of market shares (Heggestad & Rhoades, 1978; Sandler, 
1988). In contrast, I argue and show that multimarket contact can also enhance 
transaction efficiency by curbing opportunism through mutual forbearance; this benefit 
from multimarket contact and mutual forbearance has nothing to do with monopolistic 
rent because it takes place within the R&D alliance, not in end-product markets where 
combined market power can earn monopolistic rent. Therefore, I extend the domain of 
multimarket competition research from collusion-based monopolistic rent seeking to 
efficiency-based exchanges in the context of collaborative agreements. Broadly speaking, 
while the multimarket competition literature has exclusively examined the effects of 
multimarket contact on firms’ competitive strategy, I suggest that linking the implications 
and findings from the literature with cooperative strategy is an important but 
understudied research topic. 
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3.5.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Extensions might address several limitations of this study and pursue several 
other research opportunities besides the ones I have already mentioned. To begin with, it 
would be interesting to examine particular aspects of alliance governance to investigate 
the implications of multimarket contact through finer-grained analyses of collaborations. 
For instance, extensions might consider particular dimensions of hierarchical controls 
such as command structures, authority systems, incentive systems, standard operating 
procedures, dispute resolution procedures, and non-market pricing systems (e.g., Gulati 
& Singh, 1998). Since equity arrangements tend to make an interfirm exchange more 
hierarchical on all these dimensions at once, they are regarded to be the main determinant 
of hierarchy in alliances. However, firms can incorporate certain benefits of hierarchical 
control into contract designs (Argyres & Mayer, 2007), and the level of hierarchical 
control varies within each of the discrete governance structures (e.g., non-equity 
alliances, minority equity partnerships, and joint ventures) (Reuer & Ariño, 2007). In 
addition, given that opportunism can appear in various forms and at different levels, it 
would be interesting to examine specific types of opportunism and whether mutual 
forbearance through multimarket contact is uniformly important. As one example, 
multimarket contact might be able to effectively deter opportunism in non-core R&D 
activities, but when it comes to a disruptive technology, the deterrence from opportunism 
that multimarket contact provides might be insufficient to safeguard against opportunism 
(Anand et al., 2009; Jayachandran et al., 1999). In such a case, multimarket rivals may 
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write simple contract provisions on peripheral areas due to reduced risk of opportunism 
but incorporate stringent provisions pertaining to property rights. 
 Future studies might also examine the performance implications of multimarket 
contact. Deterrence from opportunism generated by multimarket contact not only may 
save costs associated with governing and managing R&D collaborations but also may 
enhance the outcomes of cooperative agreements. For example, because reduced 
opportunism between multimarket rivals decreases the likelihood of conflicts, R&D 
alliances between them may be more robust than those between alliance partners that do 
not share multiple markets (Hennart, Roehl, & Zietlow, 1999; Park & Ungson, 1997). In 
addition to shaping alliance survival, multimarket contact and the reduced opportunism it 
entails may result in better R&D performance while limiting ex post conflicts such as 
patent litigation.  
In this paper, I considered the moderating effects of external factors regarding 
factor markets and previous collaboration experience. However, the multimarket 
competition literature has suggested that internal factors can also influence the generation 
of mutual forbearance through affecting internal coordination within firms. For example, 
Golden and Ma (2003) argued that mutual forbearance is facilitated when firms have 
integrating mechanisms and incentive systems for internal cooperation within them. Yu 
and colleagues (2009) also found that local subsidiaries further reduce aggressive actions 
in their local countries when multinational companies (MNC) who are mutually 
forbearing have a higher level of ownership in their local subsidiaries, and the cultural 
distance between MNC’s home country and the subsidiary’s host country is closer. Such 
research might reveal whether internal organization, combined with the competitive 
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context of collaborative, have an impact on the governance of alliances and their 
outcomes for partners.    
Finally, it would also be valuable to carry out longitudinal analyses of firms’ 
competitive relationships and their collaborations. Whether on-going alliances are 
affected by changes in firms’ incentives based on shifting market overlaps and factor 
market competition is worthy of study. Given that my study has emphasized how firms’ 
competitive relationships influence alliance governance, it would also be valuable to 
examine how firms’ investments in alliances potentially shape their subsequent 
competitive behaviors. For instance, the accumulation of collaborative agreements 
between two firms might promote tacit collusion and monopolistic rent-seeking in other 
markets the partners share (Vonortas, 2000). Moreover, inasmuch as alliance termination 
represents a loss in firms’ opportunities to deter competitive actions, this might also have 
spillover effects in firms’ competitive relationships that future research could investigate. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, I theorized how mutual forbearance generated by multimarket contacts 
between R&D alliance partners can curb opportunism in a collaborative agreement, 
thereby enabling the partners to govern an alliance without resorting to hierarchical 
governance structures. My main theoretical contribution lies in extending theory in the 
multimarket competition literature to research on alliance governance, and I also showed 
how certain conditions intensify or weaken the effects of multimarket contacts. Beyond 
making specific contributions to the separate streams of research on alliances and 
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multimarket competition, my paper joins them and more broadly aims to advance 
knowledge on the interplay of competition and cooperation. Transcending the 
conventional view that competition and cooperation are opposites or can undermine each 
other, recent work has begun to connect the separate streams of research on competitive 
strategy and cooperative strategy (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011; Gnyawali & 
Madhavan, 2001; Khanna et al., 1998), though the interplay of competition and 
cooperation remains a “particularly vexing organizational paradox” (Chen, 2008). My 
theory and evidence on the alliance governance implications of multimarket contact 
promote a novel view that competition can enhance transactional efficiency in governing 
alliances under certain conditions, and I hope that this study encourages new research on 







CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECT OF PARTNERS’ GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION ON 
KNOWLEDGE LEAKAGE TO RIVALS 
4.1 Introduction 
Competition and cooperation are fundamental concepts in the field of strategy. 
Despite their inherent interdependence, however, the research streams on the two 
concepts have often developed separately, resulting in a lack of systematic 
understanding on the interplay between them (Chen, 2008). For example, the alliance 
literature has paid relatively little attention to the competitive context of 
collaborations. The literature that has addressed this issue has been mainly interested 
in knowledge protection concerns in alliances between direct rivals, as competition 
between alliance partners might aggravate the risks of knowledge misappropriation. 
Studies have investigated asymmetric learning between alliance partners (Hamel et 
al., 1989), learning dynamics between alliance partners (Khanna et al., 1998), the 
effects of competition between alliance partners on alliance scope (Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004), and collaboration failure (Park & Russo, 1996).  
However, even when an allying firm partners with a firm who is not a direct 
rival (e.g., when a downstream firm collaborates with an upstream firm), the allying 
firm might still have to pay close attention to knowledge protection concerns if 




rivals of the allying firm or (2) misappropriated jointly by the partner firm and rivals. 
Some recent work has begun to investigate the risk of indirect ties to rivals. For 
example, Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, and Hallen (2015) examined the negative effects 
of competitive exposure to rivals via shared intermediary organizations (i.e., venture 
capitalists). Similarly, Hernandez, Sanders, and Tuschke (2015) focused on 
knowledge spillover concerns created when board interlocks result in indirect 
connections to rival firms. I build upon and extend this work by suggesting that firms 
must be concerned with more than just the formal relationships that create indirect 
ties to rivals. Specifically, I draw upon agglomeration theory to suggest that co-
location between an allying firm’s partner and major rivals of the allying firm 
(“rivalry in partner location”) is an important but understudied factor affecting the 
risk of knowledge loss and therefore carries implications for alliance governance and 
design (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Pisano, 1989). My arguments are informed by prior 
research in the geography of knowledge, especially in the agglomeration literature, 
that has established knowledge spillovers are spatially restricted and represent a 
significant feature of geographic clusters (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; A. B. Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993). Geographic proximity to rival firms also increases 
the potential for knowledge misappropriation because proximity increases the 
likelihood that the partner and a rival may form a relationship themselves 
(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013; Narula & Santangelo, 2009).  
In this paper, I specifically investigate how incumbent firms address the risk 
of rivals’ gaining access to firm knowledge in these situations. I theorize and 




partner location is higher by (1) using equity structures to provide enhanced 
monitoring, control, and incentive alignment and (2) choosing less interdependent 
R&D projects to reduce knowledge sharing and interactions. Furthermore, given that 
actual competitive damage by knowledge leakage to rivals depends not only on the 
amount of knowledge at risk of leakage but also on the rivals’ capabilities to take 
advantage of the leaked knowledge, I further claim that the relationship between 
rivalry in partner location and these defensive mechanisms will be intensified when 
rivals surrounding the allying firm’s partner have greater absorptive capacity.  
With my theory and results, I make several contributions to the alliance 
literature and the agglomeration literature. First, I contribute to the literature on the 
competitive aspects of collaborations by highlighting how an understudied but 
interesting competitive issue, i.e., indirect links to rival firms resulting from the 
geographic location of partners, affects governance choice and alliance design. There 
has been a recent call for more research on the interplay between cooperation and 
competition. Some alliance research has responded to this call, but it has focused 
mainly on the effect of dyadic competitive relationships between alliance partners 
(Khanna et al., 1998; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996), and some 
related literature has also considered the role of indirect ties that exist due to formal 
relationships (Hernandez et al., 2015; Pahnke et al., 2015). I enrich the literature on 
the competitive aspects of collaborations by extending the scope of research inquiries 






I also contribute to the alliance literature by suggesting conditions in which 
incumbent firms address the competitive context of collaborations through their 
alliance design choices. This extends prior work that has largely focused on how 
technology ventures can protect themselves from their larger, more powerful 
incumbent firm partners (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila, Rosenberger, & 
Eisenhardt, 2008; Yang, Zheng, & Zhao, 2014). The knowledge protection concerns 
of incumbent firms remain relatively less explored, which is noteworthy because 
these firms are also exposed to the risk of knowledge loss. My work explicates 
geographic proximity between technology ventures and incumbents’ rivals as an 
understudied factor affecting incumbent firms’ knowledge control concerns.      
Finally, I also contribute to the agglomeration literature by adding new 
theoretical arguments and findings to the research on the potential downsides or 
drawbacks of agglomeration. Indeed, since Marshall's (1920) pioneering work, the 
agglomeration literature has considered knowledge spillovers to be a key benefit 
attracting firms to geographic clusters. Moreover, technology ventures located in 
geographic clusters have been argued to be particularly attractive alliance partners 
given their access to the cluster’s pool of knowledge spillovers (Rothaermel, 2002). I 
highlight that partnering with these firms may also entail risks in cases where the 
technology venture shares a location populated with rivals of the incumbent firm. In 
this respect, my work is broadly similar in spirit to Shaver and Flyer (2000) in 
highlighting the downsides of location in a geographic cluster as well as its benefits. 
Although partnering with a technology firm in a cluster does provide access to the 




knowledge could spill out into that pool and be accessed by rivals. In these particular 
situations, incumbent firms can respond by structuring the relationship to provide 
better protection of its knowledge. 
 
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Theoretical Background 
Cooperation and Competition in R&D Alliances. The formation of research 
and development (R&D) alliances between companies in high technology industries 
is a common phenomenon, with a number of potential strategic and cost-economizing 
motives driving their prevalence (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn, 
2002). In addition to their potential benefits, however, these relationship raise 
significant concerns related to the protection of technical knowledge because 
achieving the objectives of an R&D alliance often requires firms to share valuable 
knowledge. Accordingly, concern over knowledge leakage and misappropriation has 
been a core theme of research in the alliance literature (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Oxley, 
1997; Pisano, 1990).  For example, since Hamel and colleagues (1989) pointed out 
that asymmetric learning in cooperative ventures between U.S. and Japanese 
competitors critically contributed to the latter’s global success over the former, the 
research stream that Chen (2008) termed the “competition-oriented cooperation” 
literature has emphasized the risks of knowledge leakage and misappropriation in 
R&D alliances between rivals. For example, Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2000) 




to each other have strong incentives to acquire partner capabilities and, as a result, are 
more likely to reorganize or take over the alliance. In addition, based on the rationale 
that end-market competition between alliance partners increases the pay-off from 
free-riding or misappropriation, Oxley and Sampson (2004) claimed and showed that 
alliance partners with market overlap tend to limit R&D alliance activities to R&D 
alone rather than extend them to related manufacturing and/or marketing activities in 
order to reduce knowledge losses.  
Although the previous competition-oriented cooperation literature has focused 
mostly on the dyadic competitive relationship between alliance partners, more recent 
work has begun to extend the scope of inquiry from dyadic ties to a broader set of 
relationships. This work recognizes that risks exist, even when not directly partnering 
with rivals. For example, Mesquita, Anand, and Brush (2008) considered buyers’ 
sharing knowledge and developing new technologies with suppliers in vertical supply 
alliances. They suggested that this knowledge was subject to use by partner suppliers 
with other buyers and argued that focal buyers need to invest in partnership-specific 
assets and capabilities and use relational governance mechanisms to address this risk. 
Other research from outside the alliance context has highlighted that firm knowledge 
may be exposed to rivals via other formal relationships that create indirect ties to 
rivals. For example, Pahnke and colleagues (2015) investigated the situation where an 
entrepreneurial firm is indirectly connected to rival firms via common venture 
capitalists, showing that information leakage via these indirect ties to competitors 
negatively affected entrepreneurial firms’ innovation activities. In addition, 




rivals via indirect ties formed by board interlock networks. The authors argued that 
firms control such risks by terminating and avoiding ties that could create indirect 
paths to rivals; they also address risks by embedding themselves in dense networks 
where social monitoring is more prevalent. While this literature is not concerned with 
interfirm collaboration per se, it highlights the point that firms should consider risks 
not only from partnering directly with rivals but also from indirect competitive 
relationships surrounding collaborations. I next explain how similar knowledge 
concerns can arise from ties that exist even in the absence of formal relationships, 
such as when partners are located in geographic proximity to rivals.  
Geographic Co-location and Knowledge Protection Concerns. Knowledge 
spillovers are more intense between spatially proximate firms relative to distant 
counterparts. Geographic proximity enables face-to-face communication that is 
critical to transferring tacit knowledge (Daft & Lengel, 1986). There has been a 
substantial body of empirical research corroborating that geographic proximity fosters 
knowledge spillovers. For instance, Jaffe and colleagues (1993) supported geographic 
localization of knowledge spillovers by showing that patent citations are more likely 
to come from the same state and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) compared with 
the pre-existing concentration of related research activity. Similarly, Rosenkopf and 
Almeida (2003) noted a positive relationship between geographic proximity and 
knowledge flows measured by patent citations in the semiconductor industry.  
The benefits of localized knowledge spillovers have also been repeatedly 
highlighted in the agglomeration literature as one of the key benefits of co-location in 




group of interconnected firms and related institutions in a particular field. Co-location 
in a cluster fosters knowledge spillovers not only due to geographic proximity but 
also the formal and informal channels it provides. Firms co-located within a cluster 
generally prefer in-cluster transactions and exchanges and thus tend to be formally 
interconnected through, for example, licensing, technology partnerships, strategic 
alliances, and supply contracts (McCann & Folta, 2011). In addition, clusters feature 
informal channels of knowledge spillovers such as social meetings, trade meetings, 
and interfirm mobility of workers (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Saxenian, 1996).    
Although much of the agglomeration literature emphasizes the benefits of 
access to knowledge spillovers, they also represent a risk to firms who possess 
knowledge. Consistent with this view, Shaver and Flyer (2000) argued that firms with 
better technologies or human capital would be less likely to locate in a cluster because 
they contribute more to the pool of spillovers, which benefits rivals and reduces their 
own relative advantages. This is because the knowledge that spills over to the 
competitors is likely to be more valuable than the knowledge the firm itself obtains. I 
contend a similar spillover concern arises via the indirect path of partnering. Given 
that geographic proximity and co-location in a cluster facilitates knowledge 
spillovers, an allying firm is prone to knowledge leakage to its rivals when its R&D 
partner firm is co-located with more of the allying firm’s major rivals (henceforth, 
“rivalry in partner location”). In particular, knowledge spillovers by informal 
channels such as interpersonal networks and labor mobility can take place even when 




Rivalry in partner location also raises the potential risks associated with 
knowledge misappropriation. When partnering with firms who are not rivals, the 
misappropriation concern is that partners may share the focal firm’s knowledge with 
rivals. This concern is heightened when rivalry in partner location is higher, for two 
reasons. First, co-location increases the likelihood that the partner firm may form a 
future formal relationship with the allying firm’s rivals and jointly misappropriate the 
allying firm’s knowledge, as geographic proximity has been demonstrated to promote 
both alliances (Narula & Santangelo, 2009) and acquisitions (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 
2013; Narula & Santangelo, 2009). Second, the benefits of co-location noted above in 
promoting transfer of tacit knowledge also apply to knowledge a partner elects to 
misappropriate via transfer to rivals. In such cases, the effectiveness of the transfer is 
enhanced due to the geographic co-location.  
Prior to turning to my specific hypotheses regarding the mechanisms utilized 
to address these concerns associated with rivalry in partner location, I explain my 
choice of theoretical context. In the development of hypotheses below, I focus on a 
situation where (1) an incumbent firm and an R&D, or technology, venture who are 
not direct competitors enter into an R&D alliance and (2) the technology venture is 
co-located with the incumbent firm’s major rivals. Although the risk created by 
rivalry in partner location applies to some degree to all R&D alliances, I focus on 
R&D alliances between technology ventures and incumbent firms for two important 
reasons. First, because of liability of newness or smallness (Bruderl & Schussler, 
1990; Stinchcombe, 1968) and the lack of downstream capabilities, first-order 




However, second-order knowledge leakage to the incumbent firms’ rivals via 
technology ventures could be substantially harmful because the rivals could 
immediately take advantage of the leaked knowledge to undermine the incumbent 
firms in product markets. Second, given my interest in mechanisms chosen to address 
the risk associated with rivalry in partner location, it is important to examine 
partnerships in which the partner exposed to the risk has the ability to influence the 
structuring of the partnership. In R&D alliances between technology ventures and 
incumbent firms, the latter typically have significant bargaining power and thus are 
very likely to influence the design of the alliance (e.g., Mason & Drakeman, 2014). I 
turn now to an explanation of the defense mechanisms that incumbent firms adopt 
when facing higher risks of rivalry in partner location. 
 
4.2.2 Hypotheses Development 
Knowledge Protection and Choice of Equity as a Governance Mechanism. 
Since knowledge is intangible, R&D partners have difficulty measuring and 
monitoring each other’s behaviors and outcomes. In addition, R&D activities entail a 
high level of uncertainty. These attributes of R&D alliances make it difficult to write 
enforceable contractual agreements and accordingly participating firms are subject to 
opportunistic behaviors (Oxley, 1997). As a remedy for such contractual hazards, 
equity arrangements have long been suggested in the alliance literature. Equity 
ownership helps align partners’ incentives (Williamson, 1991), delineates rights and 
obligations between partners (Grossman & Hart, 1986), and also provides hierarchical 




procedures, dispute resolution procedures, and non-market pricing systems (Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Pisano, 1989). Equity participation in R&D alliances between 
technology ventures and incumbent firms may take several forms, including minority 
investment of the incumbent firm in the technology venture or the formation of a joint 
venture. In both cases, I anticipate that the inclusion of equity in R&D alliances will 
increase the incumbent firm’s ability to mitigate spillovers and misappropriation of its 
knowledge to rivals co-located with the technology venture by enhancing monitoring, 
control, and incentive alignment. 
The inclusion of equity first fosters monitoring, as it provides greater access to 
information. For example, equity investments often include representation on the 
invested partner’s board. Board participation provides observational and/or voting 
rights enabling the investing partner to better monitor its partner’s behavior, for 
example the use of contributed assets and development of new assets (Kumar & Seth, 
1998; Pisano, 1989). Enhanced monitoring allows the incumbent firm to limit the 
amount of unnecessary information sharing with the technology venture. As less 
unnecessary information is shared with the partner, the total knowledge that may spill 
over to rivals or be misappropriated is reduced. Moreover, increased ability to 
monitor fosters the early discovery of possible spillovers of knowledge, allowing the 
incumbent firm to quickly take steps to address the situation in the event of 
unintended knowledge spillovers.  
Second, equity ownership provides greater control and influence for the 
incumbent firm. For example, the incumbent firm’s existing ownership position gives 




incumbent firm elects not to acquire the technology venture itself, the incumbent firm 
can use its voting rights try to block transactions between the technology venture and 
the nearby rivals, such as R&D alliances and acquisitions (García-Canal, 1996; 
Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Yan & Gray, 1994). Even when the incumbent firm’s voting 
right may not be strong enough to veto an R&D alliance with or an acquisition by a 
nearby rival, the incumbent firm’s ownership in the technology venture and its 
intellectual property rights can help safeguard certain knowledge.  
A third benefit of equity participation is that it can help align the incentives of 
the partners and, as a result, prevent opportunistic behaviors. In general, equity 
participation enhances incentive alignment mainly by two mechanisms. First, equity 
participation penalizes opportunism through reductions in the value of equity holding 
(Pisano, 1989: 112). Second, since shares of ownership reflect relative contributions 
of each partner, the alliance partners are incentivized to make the requisite ex ante 
commitments and thus the risk of reneging on a future commitment is attenuated 
(Pisano, 1989: 112).  
Given these monitoring, control, and incentive alignment benefits from equity 
arrangements, an incumbent firm will turn to equity arrangements to a larger extent 
when it faces a higher level of risk for knowledge acquisition by its rivals via its 
partners. When an incumbent firm collaborates with a technology venture, the risk of 
knowledge spillovers to and misappropriation by the major rivals of the incumbent 
firm increases as the technology venture is surrounded by more of the incumbent 




the incumbent firm will have a greater need for the monitoring, control, and incentive 
alignment benefits that equity arrangements offer. Therefore, I posit: 
Hypothesis 1. The greater the degree of rivalry in partner location, the 
greater the likelihood the R&D alliance is equity-based. 
 
Knowledge Protection and Choice of Interdependence Level. In the previous 
section, I discussed the usage of equity-based governance structures to address 
knowledge protection concerns. In addition to such governance decisions, however, 
the alliance literature has also suggested other alliance design decisions that can be 
responsive to firms’ concerns about rivalry in partner location. 
In particular, a critical aspect of alliance design related to partners’ tasks and 
interactions is the level of interdependence (Aiken & Hage, 1968; Thompson, 1967; 
Van De Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). Viewing organizations as information 
processing systems facing uncertainty, Tushman and Nadler (1978) posited that the 
amount of task interdependence between subunits increases the need for effective 
coordination and joint problem solving; this heightened need for interaction then 
increases work-related uncertainty and, as a result, required information processing. 
Similarly, focusing on the context of alliances, Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven 
(2006) argued that high interdependence between alliance partners requires them to 
share valuable knowledge-intensive resources. Therefore, if the tasks in an R&D 
alliance between an incumbent firm and a technology venture are interdependent, 
they have to share more knowledge between them and, therefore, are exposed to a 




Indeed, the alliance literature has paid substantial attention to interdependence 
between alliance partners, but interdependence has typically been considered as a 
given task attribute affecting governance choice rather than a decision variable that 
alliance partners have to consider (Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011; Gulati & 
Singh, 1998). However, alliance partners can decide the level of interdependence by 
choosing different types of interdependence for their R&D collaborations. Thompson 
(1967) classified the types of interdependence based on input-output relationships. 
The types of interdependence are pooled, sequential, and reciprocal in order of 
increasing complexity. Pooled interdependence refers to no direct input-output 
relationship between subunits; that is, each subunit performs completely separate 
functions. Sequential interdependence occurs when the output of one unit’s activity is 
necessary for the performance by the next subunit, just as in an assembly line. 
Reciprocal interdependence is similar to sequential interdependence in that the output 
of one subunit becomes the input of another, but is different from and more complex 
than sequential interdependence in that the input-output relationship is reciprocal.  
Increasing levels of interdependence require closer working relationships and 
more knowledge transfer, which also increases the amount of knowledge that may 
leak to transaction partners. Larger amounts of transferred and leaked knowledge 
increase the risks this knowledge may be acquired by nearby rivals. I therefore expect 
the incumbent firm’s choice of interdependence to be associated with the degree of 
threat of knowledge acquisition by rivals. Because geographic co-location increases 
the risks of knowledge leakage by both spillovers and misappropriation, the 




technology venture is co-located with more of the incumbent firm’s major rivals. 
Accordingly, I predict that the incumbent firm will need to choose a lower level of 
task interdependence to curb knowledge transfers and interactions in order to reduce 
the potential risk as the nearby rivals around the technology venture are more serious 
competitors to the incumbent firm. Therefore, I posit:   
Hypothesis 2. The greater the degree of rivalry in partner location, the lower 
the interdependence of the R&D alliance.  
 
4.2.3 Moderating Effects of Nearby Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity 
So far, I have argued that when the degree of rivalry in partner location is 
high, the incumbent firm chooses equity-based governance structures and less 
interdependent R&D activities for the alliance to reduce the amount of its knowledge 
at risk of leakage to nearby rivals. However, the potential competitive damage by 
knowledge leakage to nearby rivals depends not only on the exposure created by 
geographic co-location with partners, but also on the nearby rivals’ capabilities to 
value, assimilate, and apply the knowledge leaked to them; that is, the rivals’ 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) magnifies the risk of rivalry in partner 
locations. Thus, I wish to consider how that relationship between rivalry in partner 
location and the choice of governance structures and task interdependence is 
conditioned on the nearby rivals’ absorptive capacity.  
Firms with higher absorptive capacity are able to benefit more from external 
knowledge, resulting in higher innovation rates (Tsai, 2001). One such form of 




example in the context of agglomeration, McCann and Folta (2011) showed that firms 
with higher absorptive capacity are better able to absorb and benefit from knowledge 
spillovers in clusters in the U.S. biotechnology industry. Given the important role of 
absorptive capacity in applying knowledge, I expect that rivalry in partner location 
will be less of a concern when rival absorptive capacity is low. The risk of incumbent 
firm knowledge spilling over from its partners is low when rivals have little ability to 
assimilate and apply that knowledge to compete against the incumbent firm in end 
markets. By contrast, when rival absorptive capacity is higher, rivalry in partner 
location will be a more serious concern since the rivals have an ability to assimilate 
and apply the knowledge to which they have been exposed. Given the heightened 
risks of rivalry in partner location under these conditions, incumbent firms become 
even more likely to (1) choose equity-based governance structures to benefit from the 
monitoring, control, and incentive alignment that equity arrangements provide and (2) 
further limit knowledge sharing by reducing task interdependence. Therefore, I posit: 
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of rivalry in partner location on the 
likelihood of equity-based alliance governance will be more 
pronounced as the rivals have higher absorptive capacity.  
 
Hypothesis 4. The negative effect of rivalry in partner location on 
interdependence in R&D alliances will be more pronounced as 





4.3.1 Data and Sample 
I chose R&D alliances between technology ventures and incumbent firms in 
the U.S. biopharmaceutical industry as my research setting for several reasons. First, 
the this industry is characterized by significant agglomeration (Folta et al., 2006). 
Because I focus on co-location between technology ventures and incumbent firms’ 
rivals as a theoretical factor underlying incumbent firms’ knowledge concerns, I need 
an empirical setting where firms agglomerate. Second, R&D alliances between 
technology ventures and incumbent firms are regarded as beneficial for both and thus 
are frequently observed in the industry, just as these collaborations present knowledge 
leakage and misappropriation concerns (Pisano, 1990). Third, markets are very 
clearly defined by therapeutic classes in this industry (Anand et al., 2009). In this 
study, clear market definitions are important because firms defined to be an 
incumbent firm’s major rivals should be actual, meaningful competitors whose 
products are substitutes for those of the incumbent firm.      
For the alliance data, I drew on Thomson Reuters’ Recap database, which is 
known as one of the most robust and representative data sources on alliances in the 
biopharmaceutical industry (Schilling, 2009) and includes detailed information on 
alliance governance and design. To define incumbent firm partners’ rivals, I relied on 
the IMS Health database, which provides prescription drug sales by therapeutic class 
for biopharmaceutical companies around the world. I also used the IMS Health 




firms without presence in product markets. For patent data, I used patent data from 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  
Because of my interest in the location characteristics of the technology 
venture partner, I focused on R&D alliances involving U.S.-based biotechnology 
ventures; the incumbent firm partners include both U.S. and foreign firms. Also, 
because I am interested only in rivals adjacent to U.S.-based biotechnology ventures, 
incumbent firm partners’ rivals are all U.S. firms. In the Recap database, there were 
1,242 R&D alliances between U.S. biotechnology ventures and incumbent 
pharmaceutical firms between 2007 and 2013. 
 
4.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variables. In this paper, I investigate how incumbent firms prevent 
their knowledge from being acquired by their major rivals located within the same 
area as their technology venture partners. Because I focus on two defense 
mechanisms, choice of (1) governance structures and (2) interdependence level, I 
have two different dependent variables. The first dependent variable, Equity Alliance, 
is a dichotomous variable coded one if a focal R&D alliance between an incumbent 
firm and a technology venture is equity-based, i.e., either minority equity investment 
or joint venture, and zero otherwise (Gulati, 1995b; Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996; Li et 
al., 2012; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Phene & Tallman, 2012; Pisano, 1989; Robinson 
& Stuart, 2007). Out of the 1,242 R&D alliances, 84 (6.8%) were equity-based 




My second dependent variable is a binary variable, Reciprocal 
Interdependence, which distinguishes the level of task independence between an 
incumbent firm and a technology venture. The variable takes the value of one if a 
focal R&D alliance is coded as “Collaboration” or “Co-Development” in Recap. This 
database categorizes an R&D agreement in one of these categories when both parties 
jointly participate in the research and development, and the combined participation of 
both partners in R&D activities implies reciprocal input-output relationships. Recap 
codes agreements as “Research” or “Development” if only one of the parties performs 
research or development, leaving the other downstream activities to the other party. 
These agreements fall into the category of sequential interdependence because the 
research output of one party (i.e., technology venture) is the input of an activity in 
another unit (i.e., incumbent firm). Reciprocal interdependence (the categories of 
Collaboration and Co-Development) implies stronger interdependence than sequential 
interdependence (Thompson, 1967) and thus Reciprocal Interdependence reflects the 
level of task interdependence between R&D partners consistent with Thompson’s 
(1967) definitions.  Because R&D alliances require at least some minimal level of 
input-output relationship, Thompson’s (1967) third category of pooled 
interdependence does not apply to my sample of alliances. 47% of the alliances in my 
sample were classified as involving reciprocal interdependence.                
   Independent variables. My core independent variable captures the intensity 
of firm-level product market competition between an incumbent firm partner and its 
major rivals located in the same geographic area as its technology venture partner. 




measure, I first identified the top 10 rivals of a particular incumbent firm, based on 
total revenues in the product markets in which the incumbent firm is present. In 
identifying these rivals, I followed the product-market definitions provided by IMS 
Health, which consists of 338 therapeutic classes. Then, I checked which top 10 rivals 
of the incumbent firm are located in the same geographic cluster as the technology 
venture.10 To define geographic clusters, I used Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs). In the agglomeration literature, different levels of aggregation have been 
used to identify clusters. My definition of clusters should be aligned with the distance 
with which the benefits of knowledge spillovers might meaningfully extend. Since 
Jaffe and colleagues (1993) found that localization of knowledge spillovers was 
stronger at the MSA level than at the U.S. state level, I elected to use the former. This 
aggregation level is also consistent with prior studies of agglomeration in the 
biotechnology industry (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Folta et al., 2006). Focusing on 
the top 10 rivals located in the same MSA as the technology venture partner, I 
calculated the weighted average of the aggregate market shares held by the rivals. As 
a weight for a certain market, I used the importance of the market to the incumbent 
firm, which is calculated by the ratio of the incumbent firm’s revenue from the 
product market to its total revenue as follows (please see Appendix A for an 
example):    
	 	 	 	 
i: Incumbent Firm 
                                                 
10 In the few cases in which a focal R&D alliance is a joint venture, I used the location of the joint 
venture instead of the location of the technology venture.  Inclusion or exclusion of joint ventures from 




j: Incumbent Firm i's Technology Venture partner 
m: Product markets in which Incumbent Firm i is present 
r: Incumbent Firm i's top 10 rival located within the same Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA) as Technology Venture j  
MSrm: The market share of top 10 rival r in product market m.  
 I also examine how the nearby rivals’ absorptive capacity shapes the effects of 
the co-location between the incumbent firm’s major rivals and its technology venture 
partner on the governance structure and task interdependence in the R&D alliance. To 
measure the nearby rivals’ absorptive capacity, I used the number of patents that (1) 
are issued to the nearby rivals, (2) belong to the three-digit, biotechnology-related 
patent classes, i.e., 424, 435, 436, 514, 530 (Granstrand, Patel, & Pavitt, 1997; Phene, 
Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Marsh, 2006) and (3) belong to the three-digit patent classes in 
which the incumbent firm has at least one patent. Some incumbent firms in the 
biopharmaceutical industry also have their businesses in chemical industries and 
patent in very diverse areas. However, because I focus on the nearby rivals’ 
absorptive capacity relevant to the incumbent firm’s biotechnology-related 
knowledge, I applied the three criteria above.          
Control variables. I controlled for a number of additional factors that the 
previous literature has argued to affect knowledge misappropriation and spillover 
concerns and therefore could affect alliance governance and design. First, to control 
for transaction-level attributes that may influence contractual hazards, I included the 
research stage and scope of the R&D alliance. In the industry, new drug development 
is typically categorized into discovery, lead molecule, formulation, preclinical, 
clinical phases I/II/III, and FDA approval phases. Early Stage takes the value of one 




addition, alliance scope has also been known as a factor influencing the risk of 
misappropriation (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Therefore, I also included a dummy 
variable, Alliance Scope, to indicate the breadth of alliance scope. Alliance Scope was 
coded one if an R&D alliance includes downstream activities, i.e., either 
manufacturing or marketing, and zero otherwise. 
The alliance literature has argued that social networks in which alliance 
partners are embedded provide controls for opportunistic behaviors and thus might 
also affect the risk of knowledge losses as well as the alliance design choices firms 
make (Jones et al., 1997). Following Rothaermel and Boeker (2008), I controlled for 
an alliance dyad’s social embeddedness, using variables to capture the partners’ prior 
ties, indirect ties between the two firms in the dyad, and each partner’s degree 
network centrality. To construct Prior Ties, I counted the number of prior alliances 
between the two partners in the past ten years. For Indirect Ties, I counted the number 
of indirect ties between the two partners at degree distance two, using all the alliances 
reported in Recap to represent the entire network in the biopharmaceutical industry as 
much as possible (Powell et al., 1996). As a proxy for each partner’s positional 
embeddedness (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), I constructed Degree 
Centrality of Incumbent Firm (Technology Venture), using the total number of ties the 
incumbent firm (technology venture) had entered within the entire industry network 
in the past ten years. To ensure that the measure of degree centrality is independent 
from the relational embeddedness between the two partners, I excluded the prior ties 




I also included some other firm-level attributes that may affect my dependent 
variables and be related to the risk of knowledge losses to rivals. The alliance 
literature has claimed that when alliance partners are asymmetric in size, they tend to 
have more conflicts (Li et al., 2012). Therefore, a small technology venture may need 
better incentive alignment which equity investment can provide when it partners with 
a larger incumbent firm. Also, a larger incumbent firm may have more resources to 
buy equity stakes in a technology venture. To control these effects, I included in the 
model the prescription drug sales of the incumbent firm in a given dyad, i.e., Size of 
Incumbent Firm (Gimeno, 2004). Firms with significant knowledge bases may be 
more concerned about knowledge leakage and accordingly prefer equity-based R&D 
alliances to a larger extent to protect their knowledge (Phene & Tallman, 2012). To 
control for these effects, I constructed Patent Counts of Incumbent Firm and Patent 
Counts of Technology Venture.   
The agglomeration literature has argued that geographic clusters are 
characterized by dense interpersonal and interfirm social networks within them 
(Saxenian, 1996). For this reason, social capital based on dense networks within a 
cluster may provide control functions. To control this effect, I included Cluster Size, 
which was measured by the number of biopharmaceutical companies in the MSA in 
which the technology venture in a given dyad is located. Research on geographic 
distance between alliance partners has also maintained that geographic proximity 
reduces information asymmetry between alliance partners and can also facilitate 
monitoring (McCann, Reuer, & Lahiri, 2015; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014). Therefore, I 




venture in a given dyad. Since the effect of distance might diminish beyond some 
level, particularly in international deals, I also used the natural log of the variable as a 
robustness check and obtained consistent results.     
I included three different types of fixed effects to capture other sources of 
heterogeneity. The risk of knowledge leakage and misappropriation may be 
influenced by the types of technologies and diseases for a focal R&D project. 
Therefore, I included technological domain fixed effects and disease fixed effects in 
the model. Finally, year fixed effects were also included to capture any broader, 
economy-wide factors affecting the decisions on governance structures and task 
interdependence made by alliance partners. 
 
4.3.3 Statistical Techniques 
Since my dependent variables, Equity Alliance and Reciprocal 
Interdependence, are binary, I elected to use probit regression as my main model. 
Because governance structures and task interdependence may be decided jointly and 
may be correlated I also used bivariate probit models as a robustness check. Lastly, I 
also tested my hypotheses with Heckman probit models to control for potential 
selection bias. Because my sample consists of realized alliance deals only, the dyads 
in my sample may be systematically different from the other possible unrealized 
dyads and thus selection bias may be a concern. To construct the set of 
counterfactuals of unrealized alliance deals, I considered all possible dyads for each 
year (from 2007 to 2013) using all the incumbent firms and technology ventures who 




alliances the top 10 rivals of a given incumbent firm had formed in the previous year 
to predict formation of an alliance. If its rivals were active in forming alliances in the 
previous year, the incumbent firm is more likely to seek alliances in the following 
year as a competitive response (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993) or as an 
institutional mimetic behavior (Fligstein, 1985). Consistent with these arguments, 
Garcia-Pont and Nohria (2002) noted that the propensity of firms to form alliances is 
greatly influenced by the frequency of alliance formation by other firms in the same 
strategic group in the global automobile industry.  However, it is unlikely to be 
related to its choice of alliance structures and task interdependence, so this variable is 
likely to be valid in predicting alliance formation in selection models. 
 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of the variables 
used in the analyses. Although many pairs of variables in Table 1 show significant 
pairwise correlations, multicollinearity is not a serious issue in my models. Degree 
Centrality of Incumbent Firm had the highest value of variance inflation factor (6.56), 
but is still below the recommended cutoff level of 10 (Neter et al., 1996). 
 Table 4.2 presents the results of the models analyzing the probability that a 
particular R&D alliance is equity-based or includes highly interdependent tasks. 
Model 1 is a base model including control variables only, and Model 2 introduces 
Rivalry in Partner Location to test my first hypothesis. The significant positive 
coefficient on Rivalry in Partner Location (b=1.76 and p=0.026) supports Hypothesis 




major rivals co-located with its technology venture partner increases, the likelihood 
increases that the R&D alliance is equity-based rather than a non-equity transaction. 
To evaluate the economic significance of the effect, I estimated the predicted average 
probability of equity alliances at various values of Rivalry in Partner Location. That 
is, I calculated the response for each observation and then averaged those responses at 
the median, top 10%, top 5%, and top 1% quantiles of the variable given its highly 
skewed distribution (Hoetker, 2007; Train, 1986). The predicted average probabilities 
were 6.05%, 8.59%, 10.69%, and 18.24% respectively. That is, when the value of 
Rivalry in Partner Location increases from the median to top 10%, top 5%, and top 
1%, the predicted average probability increases by 41.77%, 76.47%, and 200.07% 
respectively. To mitigate a potential concern of outliers driving the effect, I reran 
Model 2 using the natural log of the variable plus one, and I obtained a consistent 
interpretation in support of H1 (b=2.17 and p=0.022).  
Models 3 and 4 test my second hypothesis on rivalry in partner location as a 
determinant of interdependence as a dimension of alliance design. Model 3 includes 
control variables as a base model and Model 4 adds my core independent variable, 
Rivalry in Partner Location. Since the coefficient of the variable in Model 4 is 
negative and significant (b= -1.55 and p=0.011), Hypothesis 2 is also supported since 
rivalry in partner location reduces the likelihood of designing an alliance with highly 
interdependent R&D tasks. To assess economic significance, I again estimated the 
predicted average probability of reciprocal interdependence at the four values of the 
independent variable as above and obtained 48.78%, 42.43%, 38.24%, and 27.58% 




represent decrease the likelihood of reciprocity by 13.03%, 21.61%, and 43.46% 
respectively. Given the skewness of the rivalry in partner location variable, I also 
reran Model 4 using the natural log of the variable plus one and again obtained a 
consistent result (b= -1.87 and p=0.009).  
Model 5-8 in Table 4.2 show the results related to the moderating effects of 
rivals’ absorptive capacity. Model 6 and 8 include Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity and its 
interaction term with Rivalry in Partner Location to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, 
respectively. Although the coefficient estimate for the interaction term in Model 6 
was positive as predicted, it was insignificant (b= 0.0014 and p=0.382) and thus 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. However, the interaction term had a negative and 
significant coefficient in Model 8 (b =-0.003 and p=0.038), supporting Hypothesis 4. 
Therefore, rivals’ absorptive capacity does not significantly intensify the positive 
effect of rivalry in partner location on the likelihood of equity alliance, but it does 
significantly strengthen the negative effect of rivalry in partner location on the 
likelihood of reciprocal interdependence. Although the interpretation of the relevant 
coefficients supports Hypothesis 4, the effect—and even the sign—of an interaction 
can also change depending on the coefficients of the composite variables and the 
values of all of the variables in probit models (Hoetker, 2007). In Figure 4.1, 
therefore, I provide a graphical depiction of the interaction effect. Specifically, I 
compare the negative slopes between rivalry in partner location and the probability of 
reciprocal interdependence when the values of Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity are fixed 
at the mean, mean plus one standard deviation, and mean plus two standard 




Capacity increases, supporting the moderation argument in H4. To estimate the 
economic significance of the moderating effects, I estimated the decreases in the 
probability of reciprocal interdependence caused by the value increase in Rivalry in 
Partner Location from the median to top 5%, when Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity is 
fixed at the mean, the mean plus one standard deviation, and the mean plus two 
standard deviation. With Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity fixed at the mean, an increase 
of Rivalry in Partner Location from the median to top 5% decreases the probability of 
reciprocal interdependence from 49.38% to 43.40% (i.e., decrease by 12.11%). 
However, the same increase in Rivalry in Partner Location decreases the same 
probability from 52.85% to 41.02% (i.e., decrease by 22.38%) and 56.30% to 38.68% 
(i.e., decrease by 31.31%) when Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity is fixed at the mean plus 








Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Equity Alliance 1               
(2) Reciprocal Interdependence 0.04 1              
(3) Rivalry in Partner Location 0.06 -0.05 1             
(4) Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity 0.03 -0.06 0.61 1            
(5) Early Stage 0.03 0.28 0.04 -0.03 1           
(6) Alliance Scope 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.17 1          
(7) Prior Ties -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 1         
(8) Indirect Ties -0.04 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.03 -0.03 0.32 1        
(9) Degree Centrality of Incumbent Firm  0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.12 -0.12 0.07 0.29 1       
(10) Degree Centrality of Technology Venture -0.07 -0.02 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.21 0.55 0.02 1      
(11) Size of Incumbent Firm  0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.14 -0.14 0.02 0.20 0.83 0.00 1     
(12) Patent Counts of Incumbent Firm -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.27 0.07 0.30 1    
(13) Patent Counts of Technology Venture -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.02 1   
(14) Cluster Size 0.01 -0.04 0.63 0.69 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.11 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 1  
(15) Distance (Ln) 0.00 0.01 -0.19 -0.23 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 1 
Mean 0.07 0.47 0.03 122.4 0.38 0.16 0.11 0.74 87.30 9.96 15.50 150.5 70.41 61.37 9,160 
Standard Deviation 0.25 0.50 0.08 300.4 0.49 0.36 0.49 2.31 89.14 25.57 17.90 301.9 917.6 58.72 2,055 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 520.7 
Max 1 1 0.65 1,974 1 1 10 38 322 282 61.8 5,587 31,323 214 15,491 





Table 4.2. Probit Model Results 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






Rivalry in Partner Location  1.76**  -1.55** 
   (0.79)  (0.61) 
Early Stage 0.05 0.03 0.78*** 0.79*** 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
Alliance Scope -0.05 -0.06 0.09 0.10 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) 
Direct Ties -0.40 -0.37 -0.23** -0.24*** 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.09) (0.09) 
Indirect Ties 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Degree Centrality of I.F. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree Centrality of T.V. -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size of I.F.  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of I.F. -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of T.V. -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cluster Size 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.12*** -2.15*** -0.47** -0.45** 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.22) (0.22) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood -273.8 -271.8 -772.2 -769.2 
Wald Chi-squared 101.3*** 107.8*** 162.1*** 167.3*** 
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.116 0.101 0.104 
Observations 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. I.F. 






Table 4.2. Continued 
 Model 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 






Rivalry in Partner Location (1) 1.69** 1.25 -1.50** -0.52 
  (0.81) (0.96) (0.65) (0.78) 
Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity (2) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interaction Term: (1) × (2)  0.00  -0.003** 
  (0.00)  (0.001) 
Early Stage 0.03 0.04 0.79*** 0.79*** 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
Alliance Scope -0.05 -0.06 0.09 0.10 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) 
Direct Ties -0.37 -0.38 -0.24*** -0.24*** 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.09) (0.09) 
Indirect Ties 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Degree Centrality of I.F. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree Centrality of T.V. -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size of I.F.  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of I.F. -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of T.V. -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cluster Size -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.16*** -2.12*** -0.44** -0.52** 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.23) (0.23) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood -271.7 -271.4 -769.1 -767.1 
Wald Chi-squared 107.9*** 110.6*** 167.6*** 169.3*** 
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.117 0.104 0.107 
Observations 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. I.F. 







































Rivalry in Partner Location
At the mean of Rivals' Absorptive Capacity
At the mean + 1 S.D. of Rivals' Absorptive Capacity




4.4.1 Robustness Checks 
Table 4.3 presents the results of robustness analyses using bivariate probit 
models. The Wald chi-square tests did not reject the null that the correlation in 
disturbances is zero in all the models, indicating that unobserved factors do not have 
correlated influences on the two decisions. The results from bivariate probit models, 
which are known to be more efficient than those from the probit models that are 
estimated separately, also lead to the same interpretations as those presented above. 
Table 4 shows the results from Heckman probit models. In the first-stage selection 
model (Model 1), the coefficient of the number of alliances rival firms had formed in 
one year prior to a focal year (Rivals’ Num. of Alliances (t-1)) is positive and 
significant (b=0.01 and p=0.000), supporting the appropriateness of the variable as an 
instrument. Since the Wald chi-square tests did not reject the null that the correlation 
between the error term in the selection stage and that in the outcome stage is zero, I 
concluded that selection bias is not significant in my sample. Furthermore, the results 












Table 4.3. Bivariate Probit Model Results 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 












Rivalry in Partner Location   1.76** -1.55** 
    (0.79) (0.61) 
Early Stage 0.05 0.78*** 0.03 0.79*** 
  (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) 
Alliance Scope -0.05 0.09 -0.06 0.10 
  (0.17) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) 
Direct Ties -0.40 -0.23** -0.38 -0.24*** 
  (0.29) (0.09) (0.28) (0.09) 
Indirect Ties 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Degree Centrality of I.F. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree Centrality of T.V. -0.03*** -0.00 -0.03*** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Size of I.F.  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of I.F. -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of T.V. -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cluster Size 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.11*** -0.47** -2.14*** -0.45** 
  (0.38) (0.22) (0.38) (0.22) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1045.4 -1040.2 
Wald Chi-squared 279.8*** 287.2*** 
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1) 





Observations 1,242 1,242 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. I.F. 





Table 4.3. Continued 
 Model 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 












Rivalry in Partner Location (1) 1.68** -1.49** 1.23 -0.51 
  (0.81) (0.65) (0.96) (0.78) 
Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity (2) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interaction Term: (1) × (2)   0.00 -0.003** 
   (0.00) (0.001) 
Early Stage 0.03 0.79*** 0.04 0.79*** 
  (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) 
Alliance Scope -0.05 0.09 -0.06 0.10 
  (0.17) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) 
Direct Ties -0.38 -0.24*** -0.38 -0.24*** 
  (0.28) (0.09) (0.29) (0.09) 
Indirect Ties 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Degree Centrality of I.F. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree Centrality of T.V. -0.03*** -0.00 -0.03*** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Size of I.F.  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of I.F. -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of T.V. -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cluster Size -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.15*** -0.44** -2.10*** -0.52** 
  (0.38) (0.23) (0.39) (0.23) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1040.0 -1037.7 
Wald Chi-squared 288.1*** 289.3*** 
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1) 





Observations 1,242 1,242 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. I.F. 






Table 4.4. Heckman Probit Model Results 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Selection Outcome 






Rivalry in Partner Location   1.59**  -1.49** 
    (0.72)  (0.59) 
Early Stage  0.04 0.02 0.74*** 0.76*** 
   (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
Alliance Scope  -0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.09 
   (0.15) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) 
Direct Ties 0.41*** -0.51* -0.49* -0.32*** -0.33*** 
  (0.04) (0.26) (0.26) (0.10) (0.10) 
Indirect Ties 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Degree Centrality of I.F. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree Centrality of T.V. -0.00 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size of I.F. 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of I.F. 0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of T.V. -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cluster Size 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.39*** -0.74 -0.83 0.40 0.42 
  (0.06) (0.99) (1.00) (0.62) (0.62) 
Rivals’ Num. of Alliances (t-1) 0.01***     
 (0.00)     
Inverse Mills Ratio   -0.48 -0.46 -0.32 -0.33 
  (0.32) (0.32) (0.23) (0.23) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood -6,100.7 -6,373.6 -6,371.7 -6,871.9 -6,868.9 
Wald Chi-squared 1187.6*** 110.1*** 114.5*** 156.6*** 159.4*** 
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1) 









Observations 90,659 90,659 90,659 90,659 90,659 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. 
Selection model for the realized alliance deals are the same for all the outcome models. I.F. refers to 





Table 4.4. Continued 
 Model 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Outcome 






Rivalry in Partner Location (1) 1.53** 1.12 -1.43** -0.49 
  (0.74) (0.87) (0.63) (0.74) 
Rivals’ Absorptive Capacity (2) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Interaction Term: (1) × (2)  0.00  -0.003** 
  (0.00)  (0.001) 
Early Stage 0.02 0.03 0.75*** 0.75*** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
Alliance Scope -0.05 -0.05 0.09 0.10 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) 
Direct Ties -0.49* -0.49* -0.33*** -0.33*** 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.10) (0.10) 
Indirect Ties 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Degree Centrality of I.F. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree Centrality of T.V. -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size of I.F. -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of I.F. -0.00* -0.00* 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Patent Counts of T.V. -0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Cluster Size -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.85 -0.80 0.43 0.37 
  (1.00) (1.00) (0.62) (0.63) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.46 -0.46 -0.33 -0.33 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.23) (0.23) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Technology Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Pseudolikelihood -6,371.6 -6,371.3 -6,868.8 -6,866.8 
Wald Chi-squared 114.8*** 117.6*** 159.5*** 160.4*** 
Wald Test of Rho = 0: χ2(1) 









Observations 90,659 90,659 90,659 90,659 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed tests. 





In this paper, I theorize and corroborate that the governance structure and task 
interdependence of an R&D alliance between an incumbent firm and a technology 
venture is influenced by the characteristics of the technology venture’s location. More 
specifically, I argue that when the technology venture is co-located with major rivals 
of the incumbent firm, the incumbent firm faces a higher risk of knowledge leakage 
to rivals by unintentional knowledge spillovers from the technology venture to the 
nearby rivals as well as joint misappropriation by the technology venture and the 
nearby rivals. This higher risk increases the need for knowledge protection and thus 
makes the incumbent firm more likely to respond by using an equity governance 
structure and reducing task interdependence. Furthermore, I also claim that the 
absorptive capacity of the nearby rivals aggravates the risk of the nearby rivals’ 
gaining access to the incumbent firm knowledge, intensifying the effect of rivalry in 
partner location on the incumbent firm’s protective alliance design decisions. 
Empirical analyses based on 1,242 R&D alliances between technology ventures and 
incumbent firms in the biopharmaceutical industry broadly support my arguments. 
 
4.5.1 Contributions and Implications 
My theory and evidence make several contributions to the alliance literature 
as well as to the agglomeration literature. My most immediate contribution to the 
alliance literature lies in building upon and extending the competition-oriented 




potential downsides of partnering with rivals (Hamel et al., 1989; Khanna et al., 1998; 
Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Park & Russo, 1996). This literature that had paid attention 
to dyadic competitive relationships, and related research has just recently begun to 
consider the threats of knowledge leakage to rivals via indirect links such as through 
common suppliers, shared intermediary organizations, and board interlocks 
(Hernandez et al., 2015; Mesquita et al., 2008; Pahnke et al., 2015). I complement 
this emerging literature that has paid attention to formal, established ties by 
suggesting that geographic co-location between an allying firm’s partner and its rivals 
is an overlooked but important factor that can present risks of knowledge losses, and 
incumbent firms respond to these risks through their alliance design choices. 
I also contribute to the literature on R&D alliances between incumbent firms 
and technology ventures. The literature has typically focused on misappropriation by 
incumbent firms of the knowledge possessed by technology ventures. Since 
technology ventures have greater difficulty in learning partner knowledge, controlling 
knowledge flows, and reacting to misappropriation by partners (Alvarez & Barney, 
2001), it makes sense that the previous literature has mainly focused on the 
technology venture viewpoint. However, this exclusive focus on one side of the 
partnership overlooks the fact that the counterpart (i.e., incumbent firms) might also 
be concerned about knowledge loss. That is, I suggest that despite their superior 
resources and bargaining power, incumbent firms are also prone to the risk of 
knowledge loss in R&D alliances with technology ventures. In cases where this risk is 
particularly salient, incumbent firms need to devise appropriate defensive 




task interdependence vary based on the degree to which their technology venture 
counterparts are in geographic proximity to their major rivals.  
My results using equity alliance and reciprocal interdependence as dependent 
variables also make an interesting comparison with the previous literature that has 
focused on partner selection as a means for technology ventures to deal with 
knowledge misappropriation concerns (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Katila et al., 
2008). When taking the technology venture perspective, focusing on partner selection 
is sensible because technology ventures normally lack the bargaining power to attain 
other safeguards they might desire. Therefore, a realistic option to them might be to 
avoid partnering with a certain incumbent firm when it entails a high risk of 
misappropriation. By contrast, an incumbent firm may still enter into rather than 
avoid an R&D alliance with a technology venture entailing a high risk of knowledge 
loss because the incumbent firms’ superior bargaining power allows it to protect itself 
by negotiating appropriate governance structures and level of task interdependence.   
One related secondary contribution I make to the alliance literature is that I 
further extend the important but relatively sparse literature treating task 
interdependence as a decision variable (Oxley & Sampson, 2004) with finer measures 
and results. Unlike alliance research that regards task interdependence as an 
exogenously given condition mainly affecting alliance decisions by increasing 
coordination costs (Gulati & Singh, 1998), this alternative view highlights that 
alliance partners endogenously choose the level of task interdependence depending on 
the level of misappropriation risk they face. The literature has typically used alliance 




manufacturing and/or marketing, as a proxy for the level of interdependence. Despite 
many benefits such as its alignment with theory and data availability, it does not 
consider the heterogeneity in task interdependence among different R&D tasks. That 
is, when an R&D alliance includes marketing activities but its R&D tasks are just 
sequential, it is not clear that the R&D alliance with wide scope is always more 
interdependent than a pure R&D alliance of which tasks are highly reciprocal. 
Furthermore, since R&D-dedicated technology ventures might not be interested in the 
knowledge related to manufacturing and marketing, the broader scope of R&D plus 
manufacturing or marketing might not add substantially additional risk of knowledge 
loss. Because my models explain the variation in the level of R&D task 
interdependence controlling alliance scope, my results support based on a finer 
measure that a level of task interdependence is a decision made by alliance partners 
depending on the need for knowledge protection rather than an exogenously given 
condition.  
Lastly, I also contribute to the agglomeration literature by adding new insights 
and findings to the research on the downsides of agglomeration. The predominant 
emphasis in the agglomeration literature has been the benefits of geographic 
clustering, particularly because geographic co-location fosters access to a pool of 
knowledge spillovers. A small subset of the literature has raised the concern that 
firms not only draw from but also contribute to that pool. This concern has led some 
scholars to predict that firms with superior resources may be less likely to choose 
clustered locations (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). If a firm believes the costs of rivals’ 




accessing the pool of spillovers generated by the co-located rivals, firms will avoid 
entering clusters. I raise a similar concern in the context of allying with clustered 
firms. Forming alliances with firms in clusters has been suggested as a way for 
isolated firms to access the benefits of clusters (McCann & Folta, 2008), and 
empirical research indicates that clustered firms are more likely to attract partners 
(Rothaermel, 2002). While I agree that this represents an opportunity to indirectly tap 
into the cluster’s pool of knowledge spillovers, my work emphasizes that the risk of 
contributing to the pool and losing relative advantages still exists in these 
relationships. Important incumbent firm knowledge may spill over via the technology 
venture into the cluster where it is potentially accessible to rival firms. In cases where 
a significant number of incumbent firms’ rivals are co-located with the technology 
venture, the incumbent firm should take steps to reduce the potential for knowledge 
losses. 
 
4.5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has some limitations that provide fruitful opportunities for 
extensions to address. In this paper, I focused only on the increasing risk of 
knowledge spillovers and misappropriation when a technology venture is co-located 
with the major rivals of its incumbent firm partner. In an R&D alliance between an 
incumbent firm and a technology venture, knowledge shared with or newly created 
with the technology venture inevitably resides within the technology venture and thus 
the risk of knowledge spillovers and misappropriation obviously exists. As noted 




nearby rivals might also increase the benefit of knowledge spill-ins from the rivals to 
the incumbent firm through the technology venture. Although this benefit of potential 
knowledge spill-ins exists, it is relatively less certain because it depends on (1) 
whether the technology venture has absorbed the knowledge of interest to the 
incumbent firm (which is difficult to assess prior to a transaction with the technology 
venture) and (2) the ability and willingness of the technology venture to transfer that 
knowledge to the incumbent firm. For this reason, the risk of knowledge spillovers 
and misappropriation is more obvious than the benefit of knowledge spill-ins in my 
case and thus I focused on the former. However, future research could explore 
situations where potential benefits of knowledge spill-ins plays a larger role than 
potential risk of knowledge spillovers and misappropriation. For instance, when an 
incumbent firm invests in the ownership of a technology venture through corporate 
venture capital, knowledge transfers from the incumbent firm to the technology 
venture do not necessarily take place, but the incumbent firm possesses property 
rights on the knowledge of the technology venture. Therefore, while potential benefit 
of knowledge spill-ins remains, potential risk of knowledge spillovers and 
misappropriation might be relatively lower in this case. 
In this paper, I highlighted co-location or geographic proximity between an 
allying firm and its partner’s major rivals as a factor increasing the risk of knowledge 
spillovers and misappropriation. However, there are other interesting relationships 
between an allying firm and its partner’s major rivals that might influence the risk of 
knowledge loss. Examples include, but are not limited to, prior ties, spin-offs, and 




likelihood of all these relationships and events, I focused on agglomeration and the 
proximity of an incumbent firm’s rivals in this paper. However, each factor would be 
meaningful and may potentially have different implications individually and 
independently from geographic proximity per se. Future studies might examine how 
each of these factors affects firms’ external corporate development activities in terms 




To the best of knowledge, this is the first empirical study that explicitly 
examines how co-location between an allying technology venture and its incumbent 
partner’s major rivals affect the design and governance of R&D alliances. I theorize 
that co-location increases the risk of rivals’ gaining access to an incumbent firm’s 
knowledge and, therefore, the incumbent firm mitigates this concern by (1) opting for 
equity governance structures to provide greater incentive alignment, control, and 
monitoring and (2) choosing less interdependent R&D projects to reduce knowledge 
sharing. I further claim that the effects of rivalry in partner location on the usage of 
these defense mechanisms strengthen with the absorptive capacity of nearby rivals. 
My results largely support these theoretical arguments, and I hope this paper more 
broadly stimulates future research that considers the implications of the competitive 






CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I attempt to advance our understanding on the interplay 
between competition and cooperation by examining how R&D collaborations are 
affected by (1) direct competition between partner firms and (2) the geographic co-
location between an allying firm’s partner and rivals. 
More specifically, drawing on the multimarket competition literature, I argue 
that the mutual forbearance that market overlap between R&D alliance partners 
generates can curb opportunism and thus reduce the exchange hazards in their 
collaborations. Based on this argument, in Essay 1 (Chapter 2), I claim and show that 
as two firms share more markets, they estimate the partner’s inclination toward 
opportunism as lower and are thus more likely to enter into a technology cooperation. 
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) also supports that this effect is intensified for technology 
cooperation with high technological uncertainty, as well as with a broad vertical 
scope, because both cases entail a greater risk of opportunism, rendering partners’ 
proclivity toward opportunism more important as a criterion for partner selection. 
Consistently, Essay 2 (Chapter 3) shows that multimarket rivals are less likely to 
employ hierarchical governance structures for their collaborations due to the reduced 
risk of opportunism between them. The competition-oriented cooperation literature 
has argued that competition undermines cooperation by increasing the benefits 




number of market contacts might affect the possibility of partners’ retaliatory 
responses to opportunism and the costs caused by the retaliation and therefore, these 
factors should be considered to anticipate the effect of competition between alliance 
partners on their cooperation. 
In addition, by combining the multimarket competition literature and the 
literature on relational embeddedness, Essay 2 (Chapter 3) also shows that different 
dyadic relationships in which alliance partners are embedded jointly influence the 
partners’ proclivity toward opportunism. That is, factor market rivalry intensifies the 
mutual forbearance from opportunism that multimarket contact in end-product 
markets generates, while previous cooperative experience (i.e., prior ties) dampens 
the relative value of mutual forbearance due to market overlap as a remedy for 
exchange hazards. These results also propose that it is important to consider the broad 
economic—competitive or cooperative—context in which alliance partners are 
embedded in predicting the level of cooperation hazards that the alliance partners 
encounter and the consequential decisions concerning the collaboration. 
The findings from Essay 1 (Chapter 2) and Essay 2 (Chapter 3) that market 
overlap can enhance transaction efficiency by generating mutual forbearance from 
opportunism provide a critical implication to the multimarket competition literature, 
as well. The multimarket competition literature has entirely interpreted mutual 
forbearance as tacit collusion that takes place across markets to earn monopolistic 
rent and has paid exclusive attention to the benefit from multimarket contact via 
rivalry restraint (Jayachandran et al., 1999; Yu & Cannella Jr., 2013). However, the 




efficiency enhancement in transactions, and it has nothing to do with monopolistic 
rent seeking. Therefore, my dissertation sheds new light on multimarket contact and 
mutual forbearance in terms of efficiency considerations, calling for more future 
research linking the multimarket competition literature with research on cooperative 
strategy. 
In Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I combine the agglomeration literature with the 
alliance literature to argue that the geographic co-location between an allying 
technology venture and its incumbent partner’s major rivals creates indirect paths of 
knowledge leakage to the nearby rivals, influencing the design of the R&D alliance as 
a result. I maintain that when co-location aggravates the risk of rivals’ acquiring an 
incumbent firm’s knowledge, the incumbent firm is more likely to (1) choose equity-
based governance modes to enhance monitoring, control, and incentive alignment and 
(2) reduce the level of task interdependence to limit knowledge sharing. Considering 
nearby rivals’ ability to leverage external knowledge, as well as the exposure created 
by geographic co-location between partners and rivals, I further argue that the effects 
of rivalry in partner location on the usage of these defense mechanisms is intensified 
by the absorptive capacity of nearby rivals. Based on these findings, I contribute not 
only to the emerging literature on indirect knowledge leakage to rivals, but also to the 
agglomeration literature. 
Unlike the conventional competition-oriented cooperation literature that has 
been mainly interested in knowledge leakage via direct interaction between alliance 
partners (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; 




suggested that knowledge leakages to rivals can take place via indirect linkages, as 
well (Hernandez et al., 2015; Mesquita et al., 2008; Pahnke et al., 2015). However, 
this stream of research has been interested only in formal inter-firm relationships as 
an indirect channel of knowledge leakage to rivals. In Essay 3 (Chapter 4), I 
contribute to this emerging literature by suggesting geographic co-location between 
partners and rivals as an interesting but understudied path that might aggravate 
knowledge protection concerns. 
The results from Essay 3 also extend the literature on the downsides of 
agglomeration to the alliance context. The agglomeration literature has highlighted 
knowledge spillovers in geographic clusters as the main benefit that incentivizes 
firms to agglomerate, and only a small subset of the literature has suggested the 
possible costs that firms with superior resources might incur by joining a pool of 
knowledge spillovers (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). However, the literature has paid 
attention to this concern in the context of location choice, but not in the context of 
collaborating with clustered firms. Therefore, the findings in Essay 3 (Chapter 4) 
contribute to this literature by providing evidence that the risk of contributing to the 
pool and losing relative advantages also exists in partnerships with clustered firms, 
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This section is to illustrate how Rivalry in Partner Location is calculated. For this 
purpose, assume the followings: 
 
1) Incumbent Firm i and Technology Venture j enter into an R&D alliance. 
2) Technology Venture j is located in MSAc 
3) Three top 10 rivals of Incumbent Firm i, Rivali1, Rivali2, and Rivali3, are also located in 
MSAc while other top 10 rivals, i.e., Rivali4—Rivali10 are located elsewhere. 
4) In the industry, there are five distinct markets (M1~M5) and the market sizes are all 
$100.   
5) Incumbent Firm i is present in three markets, M1, M2, and M3 and earns $50, $30, and 
$20 from M1, M2, and M3 respectively. 
6) Rivali1 is present in M1, M2, M3, and M4 and earns $20, $30, $50, and $10 from M1, 
M2, M3, and M4 respectively. 
7) Rivali2 is present in M1, M2, and M5 and earns $30, $30, and $10 from M1, M2, and M5 
respectively. 





The following table summarizes the relevant firms’ revenues from each market.  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Total Revenue 
Incumbent Firm i $50 $30 $20 $0 $0 $100 
Rivali1 $20 $30 $50 $10 $0 $110 
Rivali2 $30 $30 $0 $0 $10 $70 
Rivali3 $0 $10 $20 $30 $0 $60 
Then, Rivalry	in	Partner	Location ∑ Importance ∑ MS
Importance ∑ MS Importance
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